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PRISONERS AND PLEADING 
RICHARD H. FRANKEL  
ALISTAIR E. NEWBERN 
ABSTRACT 
Last year, prisoners filed nearly 27,000 civil rights actions in federal 
court. More than 92 percent of those actions were filed pro se. Pro se 
prisoners frequently use—and in many districts are required to use—
standardized complaint forms provided by the federal judiciary. These 
standard forms were created in the 1970s at the recommendation of a 
committee of federal judges seeking to more effectively manage prisoner 
litigation and reduce its burdens on the federal courts. Although complaint 
forms have been in use for nearly forty years and are now commonplace in 
almost every federal district, no one, until now, has recognized the extent to 
which these forms may diverge from or misrepresent the law. 
In this paper, we collect and analyze every form complaint used by the 
federal district courts. Our results indicate that, while form complaints can 
be helpful to pro se prisoners and the courts, many impose requirements 
that are inconsistent with governing law. First, many complaints direct 
prisoners to plead facts that the law does not require them to plead. Second, 
many complaints prohibit or discourage prisoners from pleading facts 
necessary to survive a motion to dismiss. Third, some complaints require 
plaintiffs to plead legal conclusions, using language that may confuse 
unsophisticated prisoners and cause them to make inadvertent but 
significant legal errors.  
These flaws can impose serious unintended consequences on prisoners, 
including unwarranted dismissal of their complaints. They can also impose 
additional work on judges and court staff who must reconcile discrepancies 
between the court-provided forms and governing law. To address the 
concerns raised by our study, we provide a model form complaint that 
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accurately reflects governing law and helps courts more efficiently review 
pro se prisoner complaints and recognize potentially meritorious claims. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Courts have long struggled with the challenge of prisoner litigation. The 
volume of federal civil rights actions filed by prisoners regarding the 
conditions of their confinement is enormous.1 Last year, prisoners filed 
more than 27,000 civil rights and prison conditions cases in federal district 
courts, accounting for nearly 10 percent of the district courts’ civil docket.2  
More than 92 percent of prisoner actions are brought pro se.3 Cases 
involving pro se parties present unique challenges to the courts, whether or 
not the pro se litigant is imprisoned. Parties not trained in the law must 
navigate an unfamiliar system to bring or defend against claims, often 
against a represented opposing party whose counsel knows the lay of the 
land.4 Opposing counsel must negotiate directly with the unrepresented 
party. Court administrators must fit anomalous filings into established 
protocols. And judges must find the balance between remaining neutral 
arbiters and giving the required solicitude to pro se litigants’ potentially 
 
 
 1. The majority of cases filed by prisoners are civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
or are federal post-conviction actions brought under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 2255. Prisoners also file a 
significant number of claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act. This article focuses on federal civil rights actions by state prisoners under 
§ 1983 and its analog for federal prisoners under the cause of action established by Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 2. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS tbl. C-2 
(2015). Federal judicial statistics tables have separate categories for prisoner civil rights claims and for 
prison conditions claims. Id. Last year, prisoners filed 18,474 civil rights cases and 9,762 conditions of 
confinement cases. Id. Both types of suits are brought as civil actions under § 1983. See generally 
McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136 (1991) (describing challenges to “conditions of confinement” as 
claims involving unconstitutional conduct by prison officials that would be properly brought as civil 
rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). According to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, “pro 
se litigation comprises more than a quarter of the federal Judiciary’s civil caseload, and two-thirds of all 
pro se litigation is initiated by prisoners.” Judicial Conference Approves Prisoner Case Filing and Judge 
Assistance Pilot Programs, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS (Sept. 13, 2016), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2016/09/13/judicial-conference-approves-prisoner-case-filing-and-
judge-assistance-pilot. 
 3. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS tbl. C-13 
(2014). This number may include habeas corpus petitions, because the statistical tables for pro se 
prisoner petitions do not distinguish between civil rights claims and habeas corpus claims. This high rate 
of pro se litigation may be caused, in part, by the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s significant disincentives 
to retained counsel. The Act presumptively denies an attorney’s fee award, limits a fee award to 150% 
of the judgment, and requires that an attorney’s rate be capped at 150% of that established by statute for 
court-appointed counsel. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (2012). 
 4. A 2011 survey of sixty-one chief judges of federal district courts reported that their major 
concerns with pro se litigation included “pro se litigants’ lack of knowledge about legal decisions or 
other information that would help their cases,” and “pro se litigants’ failure to understand the legal 
consequences of their actions or inactions (e.g., failure to plead statute of limitation, failure to respond 
to requests for admissions).” DONNA STIENSTRA, JARED BATAILLON, & JASON A. CANTONE, FED. 
JUDICIAL CTR., ASSISTANCE TO PRO SE LITIGANTS IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: A REPORT ON SURVEYS 
OF CLERKS OF COURT AND CHIEF JUDGES, at vii (2011) [hereinafter ASSISTANCE TO PRO SE LITIGANTS]. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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meritorious claims.5 The greatest difficulty is often in simply discerning 
what those claims are.6 The extra time judges spend doing so further taxes 
court resources. Meritorious claims risk being overlooked simply because 
of poor drafting. 
These burdens are almost always compounded in prisoner litigation. The 
fact of incarceration raises additional hurdles for pro se plaintiffs. Many 
prisons have drastically curtailed or eliminated their law libraries, removing 
resources that could help prisoners navigate the legal system.7 Even where 
such resources are available, they are often still inaccessible to prisoners, 
whose literacy and language skill levels fall well below those of the general 
population.8 Prisoners also suffer from a higher-than-average rate of 
intellectual and mental disabilities.9  
Pro se prisoner litigation is notoriously described as frivolous and a 
burden on the federal courts.10 Every prisoner faces the challenge of 
competing for judicial attention against the many thousands of complaints 
filed by fellow inmates. Inmate civil rights claims often receive no more 
 
 
 5. Any document filed by a pro se litigant is “to be liberally construed” and “a pro se complaint, 
‘however inartfully pleaded,’ must be held to ‘less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 
lawyers.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 
(1972)). This creates a “dilemma” for judges between the competing goals of “assur[ing] that mere 
procedural technicalities do not trip up the unwary litigant” and ensuring that “both the represented and 
unrepresented must follow the same procedural rules.” Robert Bacharach & Lyn Entzeroth, Judicial 
Advocacy in Pro Se Litigation: A Return to Neutrality, 42 IND. L. REV. 19, 20 (2009).  
 6. ASSISTANCE TO PRO SE LITIGANTS, supra note 4, at vii. 
 7. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), which limited the 
scope of a prisoner’s constitutional right of access to the courts, Arizona eliminated thirty-four prison 
law libraries, and Idaho officials sold the contents of multiple prison law libraries on eBay for one 
hundred dollars plus shipping. Evan R. Seamone, Fahrenheit 451 on Cell Block D: A Bar Examination 
to Safeguard America's Jailhouse Lawyers from the Post-Lewis Blaze Consuming Their Law Libraries, 
24 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 91, 91–92 (2006). 
 8. Prisoners often function at two to three grade levels below the level actually completed in 
school. Fourteen percent of prisoners did not complete the eighth grade. Jessica Feierman, “The Power 
of the Pen”: Jailhouse Lawyers, Literacy, and Civic Engagement, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 369, 372 
(2006). The average reading level of many state prisoners has been calculated as equal to that of a sixth 
grader; their language skills are equal to those who have completed fourth grade. Thomas C. O’Bryant, 
The Great Unobtainable Writ: Indigent Pro Se Litigation After the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 310 & n.75 (2006).  
 9. See Howard B. Eisenberg, Rethinking Prisoner Civil Rights Cases and the Provision of 
Counsel, 17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 417, 442–43 (1993) (describing educational and intelligence limitations of 
prison populations, including that the average IQ of prisoners may be as low as eighty, that 70 percent 
of prisoners have not completed high school, that the rate of mental illness and developmental disability 
is three to ten times higher in prison than in the general population, and that prisoner literacy levels are 
quite low); DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES (2006), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf (finding that more than half of prison and jail inmates 
suffered from some form of mental illness). 
 10. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/7
  
 
 
 
 
2016] PRISONERS AND PLEADING 903 
 
 
 
 
than an “hour of judge time, from filing to disposition.”11 As Justice Robert 
Jackson wrote in 1953, it “must prejudice the occasional meritorious 
application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones” and “[h]e who must 
search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the 
needle is not worth the search.”12 
But ensuring that pro se prisoners can file complaints, and ensuring that 
those complaints are meaningfully reviewed, is important. “[P]ro se inmate-
initiated civil rights litigation has historically accounted for many of the 
important improvements in prison conditions during the last three 
decades.”13 Many cases that established groundbreaking prison reforms or 
identified important constitutional principles—such as Johnson v. 
California’s successful challenge to double-celling prisoners based on race 
and Estelle v. Gamble’s recognition that the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition of cruel or unusual punishment applies to deliberate indifference 
to prisoners’ medical needs—began as pro se complaints.14 But, as Justice 
Jackson recognized, if the potential merit of a prisoner’s claim is not readily 
apparent on the face of his complaint, it likely will not be discovered. 
In an early effort to address these issues, a committee of federal judges 
took on the task of making recommendations for “the more effective 
handling” of pro se prisoner litigation15 while also ensuring the ability “to 
give prompt relief to meritorious prisoner cases.”16 The committee’s 
response included a model form complaint to be used by prisoners filing 
civil rights cases.17 The committee believed that providing a standardized 
pleading form would help direct pro se prisoner plaintiffs to the legally 
 
 
 11. Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1589 (2003).  
 12. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 13. Roger Roots, Of Prisoners and Plaintiffs’ Lawyers: A Tale of Two Litigation Reform Efforts, 
38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 210, 221 (2002). 
 14. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 515 (2005); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 99 (1976).  
 15. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING PRISONER CIVIL 
RIGHTS CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, at viii (1980) [hereinafter 1980 REPORT].  
 16. Id. at xi, 2; see also FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING 
PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: TENTATIVE REPORT 12 (1976) [hereinafter 
1976 REPORT]. 
 17. This Article focuses specifically on complaints alleging violations of a prisoner’s civil rights 
based on the conditions of the prisoner’s confinement, or the mistreatment a prisoner experiences while 
incarcerated. Those claims are governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the prisoner is in state or local prison or 
jail. For federal prisoners, civil rights claims are governed by the cause of action recognized in Bivens 
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Section 1983 
actions are much more common than Bivens claims, most likely because the vast majority of prisoners 
are incarcerated in state institutions, and because Bivens provides a narrower cause of action than § 1983. 
See generally Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017) (describing the limited scope of Bivens). This 
Article does not focus on habeas corpus claims, which challenge the validity of the prisoner’s underlying 
criminal conviction or sentence or the legality of the prisoner’s incarceration. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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relevant aspects of their claims and, by instructing prisoners to state their 
case “as briefly as possible,” reduce the risk of relevant allegations getting 
lost in a sea of unnecessary information.18  
The form complaint has been very popular with courts. Today, ninety-
two of the ninety-four federal districts use a variation of it.19 Form 
complaints are widely regarded by judges, court personnel, and academics 
as a helpful and important access-to-justice reform.20 But despite the forms’ 
prevalence and the enormous volume of pro se prisoner litigation that 
employs them, there has not been a systemic academic review of the 
districts’ complaint forms since their adoption.  
This Article undertakes that task. We examined every form complaint 
for pro se prisoners used by the federal district courts. Our research found 
that, although well-intentioned, the form complaints employed in many 
districts may actually impede the proper and efficient review of prisoner 
claims and exacerbate other burdens that are unique to prisoner litigation. 
For example, the Prison Litigation Reform Act,21 which (like form 
complaints) seeks to streamline prisoner litigation, imposes additional 
procedures for filing prisoner civil rights claims and on the courts that must 
review them, and disincentives for lawyers to take such cases. 
The form complaints’ problematic aspects fall into three categories. 
First, numerous form complaints require pro se prisoner plaintiffs to plead 
information the law does not require them to plead. For example, 77 percent 
of form complaints require prisoners to answer a series of questions about 
whether they have exhausted their administrative remedies, even though the 
Supreme Court has explicitly held that exhaustion is not a pleading 
requirement.22 More than 85 percent of form complaints require inmates to 
provide information about other lawsuits they have filed, although that also 
 
 
 18. See 1980 REPORT, supra note 15, at 12, 46–47, 54–57. See also 1976 REPORT, supra note 16, 
at 47 (providing sample form complaint directing plaintiffs to plead their facts “as briefly as possible”). 
 19. Only two districts, the District of the Northern Marianas Islands and the District of 
Massachusetts, do not appear to have form complaints for prisoner civil rights claims. However, those 
two districts account for a very small number of pro se prisoner civil rights actions. See infra note 73 
and accompanying text.  
 20. A recent survey of the clerks of court and chief judges of federal district courts found that 
standardized forms are perceived by the courts as one of the most helpful tools for managing pro se 
litigation. ASSISTANCE TO PRO SE LITIGANTS, supra note 4, at vi, viii, 16, 33; see also Tracey I. Levy, 
Comment, Mandatory Disclosure: A Methodology for Reducing the Burden of Pro Se Prisoner 
Litigation, 57 ALB. L. REV. 487, 513 (1993) (“Standardized pro se complaint forms for prisoners 
asserting § 1983 claims help to clarify complaints.”). 
 21. Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801–810, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 to -
77 (1996). 
 22. See infra notes 82, 98–100 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/7
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is not required.23  
Second, form complaints may impede plaintiffs from pleading sufficient 
facts to make out their claim. Seventy-three percent of current form 
complaints instruct prisoners to state the facts “briefly” or “as briefly as 
possible,” and discourage them from providing detailed factual 
allegations.24 Some go a step further by discouraging or limiting prisoners 
from including additional pages if the space provided on the complaint form 
is not sufficient. Others limit the number of attachments a plaintiff can 
include or prohibit attachments altogether, even though courts regularly 
consider documents attached to a complaint when evaluating a complaint’s 
sufficiency and attached documents can clarify a pro se plaintiff’s 
allegations.25 Finally, many forms prohibit prisoners from referring to any 
cases or legal authority, which also can help illuminate a pro se plaintiff’s 
allegations. Notably, these restrictions apply almost exclusively to prisoner 
litigation.  
At the time the original form complaint was developed—in the era of 
notice pleading—the courts’ concern was that many prisoner complaints 
were too long and hard to decipher, with facts giving rise to a claim getting 
lost in a sea of irrelevant information.26 But today, the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly27 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal28 have 
tightened pleading standards to require that a plaintiff plead sufficient facts 
to establish a plausible, rather than a possible, entitlement to relief.29 A 
plaintiff who tries to state facts “as briefly as possible” may be more likely 
to produce the kind of conclusory allegations that Twombly and Iqbal found 
insufficient. In their wake, a complaint that errs on the side of omitting facts 
for the sake of brevity may be more susceptible to dismissal than one that 
errs on the side of including too much detail. Pro se prisoners who dutifully 
follow the form’s instructions may find that they have not given enough 
detail to state a plausible claim, and judges may be left to puzzle over an 
 
 
 23. See infra notes 83–85 and accompanying text.  
 24. See infra notes 87, 148 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra notes 88–91, 175 and accompanying text. 
 26. See infra notes 35–45 and accompanying text. 
 27. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 28. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 29. There is an argument that Twombly and Iqbal should not apply to pro se prisoners; rather, pro 
se complaints should be governed by the Supreme Court’s more lenient standard from Erickson v. 
Pardus, a case that was decided after Twombly. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007). There, in 
evaluating the sufficiency of a pro se prisoner’s complaint, the Court stated: “Specific facts are not 
necessary; the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds 
upon which it rests.’” Id. at 93 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). However, most district courts 
continue to apply Twombly’s and Iqbal’s heightened pleading standard to prisoner’s claims without 
challenge. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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unnecessarily lacking complaint.  
Third, some complaints use technical legal terms that may confuse 
unsophisticated prisoner litigants and lead to unintentional pleading errors. 
For example, some complaints direct plaintiffs to indicate whether they are 
suing defendants in their official or individual capacities, often by checking 
a box, even though the plaintiff may not understand the difference or realize 
that selecting “official capacity” immunizes many defendants from damages 
liability. Other complaints ask plaintiffs to identify whether and how 
defendants were acting “under color of state law.”30 An inadvertent error by 
a plaintiff who fails to understand these terms could cause the plaintiff to 
unintentionally negate claims against certain defendants. Facts pleaded in 
the complaint may lead to a different conclusions than the plaintiff’s 
answers to these questions, which the court must then reconcile. 
Prisoner litigation already faces skepticism from commentators, 
politicians, and the public, many of whom believe that most, if not all, of it 
is frivolous or a waste of courts’ time.31 Some commentators believe that 
pro se litigants—prisoner and non-prisoner alike—receive too much 
assistance from the courts and gain an unfair advantage.32 And yet, pro se 
civil rights complaints remain an important vehicle through which courts 
 
 
 30. Under § 1983, a plaintiff may only sue defendants who act “under color” of state law. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 (2012). 
 31. See Jon O. Newman, Pro Se Litigation: Looking for Needles in Haystacks, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 
519, 519 (1996) (describing the common perception of pro se prisoner litigation as frivolous); Douglas 
A Blaze, Presumed Frivolous: Application of Stringent Pleading Requirements in Civil Rights 
Litigation, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 935, 937–38 (1990) (describing judicial perception of pro se 
prisoner litigation as largely frivolous); FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR 
HANDLING CIVIL RIGHTS CASES: TENTATIVE REPORT NO. 2, at 7 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 REPORT] (“It 
is generally agreed that most prisoner rights cases are frivolous and ought to be dismissed even under 
the most liberal definition of frivolity.”). In 1995, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act 
(PLRA) to try to reduce what it perceived as a high volume of frivolous prisoner lawsuits that were 
clogging the courts with meritless claims. Introducing an early version of the PLRA, Senator Orrin Hatch 
described the Act’s purpose as “bring[ing] relief to a civil justice system overburdened by frivolous 
prisoner lawsuits. Jailhouse lawyers with little else to do are tying our courts in knots with an endless 
flood of frivolous litigation.” 141 CONG. REC. S14418 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Orrin 
Hatch).  
 32. Michael Correll, Finding the Limits of Equitable Liberality: Reconsidering the Liberal 
Construction of Pro Se Appellate Briefs, 35 VT. L. REV. 863, 864–65 (2011) (asserting that the judicial 
rule providing for liberal construction of pro se pleadings exempts pro se litigants from rules applicable 
to counseled litigants, gives them “a special access to the courts and, arguably, a better standard of 
review than that enjoyed by their represented counterparts,” all of which gives pro se litigants a “unique 
preferred status” in the courts); Drew A. Swank, In Defense of Rules and Roles: The Need To Curb 
Extreme Forms of Pro Se Assistance and Accommodation in Litigation, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1537, 1548 
(2005) (“Some lawyers and judges even express concerns that pro se litigants are using their status to 
gain an unfair advantage over represented parties, who are required to ‘play by the rules.’”); Bacharach 
& Entzeroth, supra note 5, at 19 (arguing that the role of judicial neutrality has “derailed” in favor of 
rules that show favoritism toward pro se litigants). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/7
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ensure equal justice under law. The forms created to assist plaintiffs in 
bringing those claims must correctly reflect governing law and must not 
subject pro se plaintiffs to burdens not imposed on others that may cause 
meritorious claims to be improperly or prematurely dismissed. 
Safeguarding the accuracy and clarity of prisoner form complaints is 
especially important because many of the other reforms designed to help 
pro se litigants do not reach prisoners. Programs like self-service kiosks at 
courthouses, interactive online tools with fill-in-the-blank templates that 
include guided help, or more personal assistance from pro bono clinics and 
clerk’s offices have been touted as helpful resources.33 But prisoners who 
cannot travel to the courthouse to use the kiosk, who have no access to the 
internet, and who generally cannot call a court clerk or attend a clinic, 
cannot access those resources.34 As a result, it is that much more important 
to make sure that the few resources pro se prisoner litigants receive—and 
particularly those provided by the courts themselves—do not exert 
unintended negative consequences. 
Part I of the Article examines the development of the model form 
complaint in the 1970s. Part II describes our research in reviewing all of the 
federal districts’ form complaints and synthesizes our results. Part III 
elaborates on how certain aspects of form complaints are inconsistent with 
current law or create unique adversities for pro se prisoners. Part IV offers 
proposals for reform, including a revised model form complaint that 
correctly reflects governing law and reduces unintended hurdles for 
prisoners and courts alike. We hope these revisions will restore the model 
complaint to fulfilling its original purpose of assisting pro se prisoners in 
bringing potentially meritorious claims while easing the burden of prisoner 
litigation on the federal judiciary. 
I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRISONER FORM COMPLAINT 
The original model form complaint was created as part of the federal 
judiciary’s response to the rise in prison litigation volume starting in the 
1960s. In the early 1970s, the Federal Judicial Center convened a committee 
of federal judges “to study the handling of prisoner cases in federal courts 
 
 
 33. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.  
 34. Some federal prisoners may soon have the opportunity to use self-service kiosks for e-filing 
documents. A one-year pilot program will allow prisoners in select jurisdictions to file pleadings 
electronically as do other litigants in federal court. See Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson, Prison E-Filing 
Kiosks Will Help Prisoners, Courts, 85 U.S.L.W. 372 (Sept. 15, 2016). However, these kiosks merely 
allow prisoners to electronically file pleadings that they have already produced. It does not provide them 
with templates or guidance on what pleadings to file or on how to prepare them. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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and to propose procedures for the more effective handling of these cases.”35 
The committee’s charge was finding “methods of alleviating the burden in 
the district courts in which approximately one out of every seven civil cases 
filed is from a prisoner seeking various forms of relief.”36 The committee’s 
twin aims in creating the model form complaint were to improve court 
efficiency in handling prisoner cases so as to reduce resource burdens on 
the judiciary and to improve the judiciary’s ability to find the potentially 
meritorious needles in the growing haystack of prisoner claims.37 The 
committee emphasized that the “best possible system for identifying the 
meritorious case must be developed.”38 
Describing prisoner litigation’s strain on judicial resources, the 
committee found that “most [prisoner complaints] contain a large variety of 
allegations that are hard to separate and to evaluate; and commonly the 
allegations are contained in a long, often illegible, handwritten letter from 
the inmate.”39 As a result, the committee concluded, it was hard for judges 
to understand the nature of prisoners’ complaints,40 not because the plaintiff 
pleaded insufficient facts, but because judges had trouble “deciphering” the 
facts that were included.41 Still today, many commentators and judges 
believe that pro se complaints often contain unhelpful allegations, legal 
conclusions, and pontifications that obscure the discrete factual allegations 
that could form the basis for a viable claim. A 2011 survey of sixty-one 
chief judges of federal district courts reported that the judges’ number one 
concern for pro se cases was “pleadings or submissions that are 
unnecessary, illegible, or cannot be understood.”42  
 
 
 35. The committee produced three reports: a “Tentative Report” in January 1976, a “Tentative 
Report No. 2” in 1977, and a final report in 1980. 1980 REPORT, supra note 15, at vii; 1977 REPORT, 
supra note 31, at i; 1976 REPORT, supra note 16, at 6.  
 36. 1980 REPORT, supra note 15, at vii, 2; 1977 REPORT, supra note 31, at ii; see also 1976 
REPORT, supra note 16, at 11 (describing the rising volume of prisoner cases). 
 37. The committee prioritized “increas[ing] the capacity to give prompt relief to meritorious 
prisoner cases,” explaining that because of the high volume of cases, “it is difficult to ensure that the 
meritorious complaint will not be overlooked.” 1980 REPORT, supra note 15, at x, 2, 7, 11. 
 38. 1976 REPORT, supra note 16, at 12. 
 39. 1980 REPORT, supra note 15, at 12; 1977 REPORT, supra note 31, at 8–9. See also 1976 
REPORT, supra note 16, at 14. 
 40. 1980 REPORT, supra note 15, at 12; 1976 REPORT, supra note 16, at 26. 
 41. 1976 Report, supra note 16, at 14. 
 42. ASSISTANCE TO PRO SE LITIGANTS, supra note 4, at vii, 21; see also, Lois Bloom & Helen 
Hershkoff, Federal Courts, Magistrate Judges, and the Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS 
& PUB. POL’Y 475, 483 (2002) (“Moreover, the legally untrained face special difficulties in navigating 
and carrying out the arcane requirements of pleading and instead ‘often submit awkward and confusing 
complaints.’” (quoting Stephen M. Feldman, Indigents in the Federal Courts: The in Forma Pauperis 
Statute—Equality and Frivolity, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 413, 419 (1985))); id. at 513 (describing pro se 
complaints as “difficult to decipher” (quoting Kim Mueller, Inmate’s Civil Rights Cases and the federal 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/7
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To address these concerns, the committee issued several 
recommendations, including that “[e]ach district court having a substantial 
caseload of prisoner complaints should promulgate local rules adopting a 
complaint form to be used for all 1983 actions.”43 The committee created a 
model complaint form for district courts to use in developing their own form 
pleadings.44 The committee concluded that use of a form complaint would 
provide structure to pleadings that “would otherwise be vague, verbose and 
incomprehensible,” and would thus enable judges to determine if the 
complaint could withstand a motion to dismiss.45 
A. The Committee’s Model Complaint 
The committee’s model complaint form begins with a page of 
instructions that includes several items of note.46 First, it begins with an 
emphatic directive that the complaint form be used: “The clerk will not file 
your complaint unless it conforms to these instructions and to these 
forms.”47 Second, it requires that the prisoner “sign and declare under 
penalty of perjury that the facts are correct,”48 mandating a verified 
complaint.49 Third, it states that, if the prisoner needs additional space to 
 
 
Courts: Insights Derived from a Field Research Project in the Eastern District of California, 28 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1255, 1280 (1995)); Levy, supra note 20, at 488 (criticizing prisoner complaints as 
“lengthy and difficult to analyze”); id. at 505 (asserting that “the clarity of [pro se prisoner] complaints 
themselves can cause serious problems for court clerks and government attorneys”); Wayne T. Westling 
& Patricia Rasmussen, Prisoners’ Access to the Courts: Legal Requirements and Practical Realities, 16 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 273, 309 (1985) (“Even an otherwise meritorious claim can become lost in a tangle of 
facts, extraneous material, unsupported assertions, and fallacious arguments.”); Michael J. Mueller, 
Note, Abusive Pro Se Plaintiffs in the Federal Courts: Proposals for Judicial Control, 18 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 93, 102 (1984) (“Even where complaints are filed in good faith, they are often rambling, 
duplicative and hopelessly general.”); Donald H. Zeigler & Michele G. Hermann, The Invisible Litigant: 
An Inside View of Pro Se Actions in Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157, 182 (1972) (describing 
how prisoners often plead in generalities, resort to hyperbole, and write complaints that are “rambling 
and conclusory”). 
 43. 1976 REPORT, supra note 16, at 28; accord 1977 REPORT, supra note 31, at 43 (“Each district 
court having a substantial case load of prisoner complaints should adopt by local rule a complaint form 
and also such other forms as are helpful in processing conditions-of-confinement cases. This is 
particularly important in this field of litigation where most plaintiff-prisoners are proceeding pro se.”); 
1980 REPORT, supra note 15, at 45 (stating the same as the 1977 Report). 
 44. 1980 REPORT, supra note 15, at 89–92; 1977 REPORT, supra note 31, at 82–85; 1976 REPORT, 
supra note 16, at 44–49. 
 45. 1980 REPORT, supra note 15, at 46, 54–55; see also 1977 REPORT, supra note 31, at 51. 
 46. 1976 REPORT, supra note 16, at 44–49. The 1980 complaint is only four pages long, including 
instructions. 1980 REPORT, supra note 15, at 89–92. The difference seems to be based on the use of a 
smaller typeface and because the 1980 complaint provides less blank space for prisoners to use when 
filling in the various sections of the complaint. Otherwise, the complaints are identical. 
 47. 1980 REPORT, supra note 15, at 89.  
 48. Id. 
 49. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a verified pleading except in derivative 
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answer a question, he “may use the reverse side of the form or an additional 
blank page.” Fourth, it instructs that the complaint “SHOULD NOT 
CONTAIN LEGAL ARGUMENTS OR CITATIONS.”50 
Section I of the model complaint is devoted to the prisoner’s prior 
lawsuits. It asks if the prisoner has “begun other lawsuits in state or federal 
court dealing with the same facts involved in this action or otherwise 
relating to your imprisonment,” providing boxes for the prisoner to check 
yes or no.51 The form asks the prisoner to state the parties, court, docket 
number, assigned judge, and disposition of any prior suits. It appears that 
the committee thought this information important to ensure that all of a 
prisoner’s actions be assigned to a single judge, which “discourages judge-
shopping and increases efficiency in processing repetitive complaints.”52 
Section II addresses exhaustion of administrative remedies. The form 
asks if the prison where the plaintiff is incarcerated has a grievance 
procedure and, if so, whether the plaintiff filed a grievance regarding the 
facts giving rise to the complaint.53 The form asks what steps the prisoner 
took through the grievance system and what outcome resulted.54 If the 
prisoner did not file a grievance, the form directs him to explain why not.55 
If the prison has no grievance procedure, the form asks if the plaintiff 
complained to prison authorities and what result, if any, was achieved.56 
At the time the committee drafted the model complaint, exhaustion of 
administrative remedies was not required as a precondition to filing a § 1983 
civil rights claim.57 Exhaustion did not become mandatory until passage of 
the PLRA in 1996.58 The committee included questions about exhaustion to 
 
 
actions by shareholders, depositions to perpetuate testimony, and temporary restraining orders. FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23.1, 27(a)(1), 65(b). It may be that adding this requirement to civil rights actions is seen as 
analogous to the statutory requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (2012) that applications for a writ of habeas 
corpus be verified by the petitioner. 
 50. 1980 REPORT, supra note 15, at 89. 
 51. Id. at 90. 
 52. Id. at 53; see also 1977 REPORT, supra note 31, at 49 (same). 
 53. 1976 Report, supra note 16, at 46. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 47. 
 56. 1980 Report, supra note 15, at 91. 
 57. See, e.g., id. at 55–56 (“A series of brief, often per curiam, Supreme Court decisions indicate 
that such procedures need not be exhausted prior the filing of a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). 
 58. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012). Between 1980 and the enactment of the PLRA, Congress adopted 
a hybrid exhaustion requirement. Under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 
enacted in 1980, Congress authorized the Attorney General to establish a set of minimum standards for 
state grievance systems. Congress also provided that if a state correctional institution adopted a 
grievance system satisfying those standards, the district court had discretion to stay any litigation by a 
prisoner at that institution so that the prisoner could exhaust administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e 
(1994) (repealed); see also Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 467 (describing exhaustion procedures under 
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benefit the plaintiff and court. The committee explained that “a question 
relating to grievance procedures is appropriate because it may alert the 
inmate to this extra judicial method of resolving his complaint and because 
the inmate may have used the grievance procedure, and the administrative 
record, if available, may be helpful to the federal court.”59  
Section III details the parties to the action. It asks the plaintiff to provide 
her name and address and the name, position, and place of employment of 
each defendant.60 Section IV is devoted to the plaintiff’s statement of the 
claim. It directs the plaintiff to “[s]tate here as briefly as possible the facts 
of your case.”61 It directs the plaintiff to describe how each defendant was 
involved and give “names . . . dates, and places” of other actors and events.62 
It orders the plaintiff not to “give any legal arguments or cite any cases or 
statutes.”63 Finally, it directs the plaintiff to use “as much space as you need” 
and to “[a]ttach extra sheet if necessary.”64 The form then provides six blank 
lines for the plaintiff to describe the facts of the claim.65  
Section V, titled “Relief,” asks the plaintiff to “[s]tate briefly exactly 
what you want the court to do for you,” and instructs the plaintiff to “[m]ake 
no legal arguments” and to “[c]ite no cases or statutes.”66 Four more blank 
lines are provided.67 The end of the form requires the plaintiff to sign, date, 
and verify the complaint.68 
 
 
CRIPA). However, only a few states obtained certification under this regime. See REPORT OF THE 
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 49 (1990); Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 467–68. 
 59. Id. at 56; 1977 REPORT, supra note 31, at 52–53 (replacing “extra judicial” with “nonjudicial”); 
1976 REPORT, supra note 16, at 31 (same). 
 60. 1976 REPORT, supra note 16, at 47. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. By using the singular “sheet” rather than the plural “sheets,” the drafters may have created 
an unintentional ambiguity as to whether a prisoner is limited to a single additional sheet or whether the 
prisoner may attach as many extra sheets as necessary. Notably, a number of current form complaints 
perpetuate that ambiguity by using the same language rather than simply changing “sheet” to “sheets.” 
See, e.g., Form Complaint (D. Me.); Form Complaint (D.R.I.). 
 65. 1980 REPORT, supra note 15, at 92. The original iteration of the model form provided twelve 
lines. 1976 REPORT, supra note 16, at 47–48. 
 66. 1976 REPORT, supra note 16, at 48.  
 67. 1980 REPORT, supra note 15, at 92 (emphasis omitted). Again, the number of lines was reduced 
from the earlier version, which provided twelve. 1976 REPORT, supra note 16, at 48. 
 68. 1976 REPORT, supra note 16, at 49. 
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B. Adoption of the Model Complaint 
The model form complaint was popular. By 1993, more than half the 
federal district courts had adopted a version of it.69 Following the enactment 
of the PLRA in 1996, the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) emphasized the 
value of “well-designed” form complaints in evaluating prisoner litigation.70 
Notably, the FJC’s report stated that “courts should review forms developed 
before the PLRA to ensure that they reflect the statute’s procedural 
requirements.”71 The form complaints it referenced as examples, however, 
substantially mirrored the original model form complaint from the 1970s.72  
Since the PLRA’s enactment, form complaints have become nearly 
universal. Ninety-two of the ninety-four federal districts—nearly 98 
percent—use pro se form complaints, most of which closely resemble the 
original model.73 In 2015, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 
created a series of illustrative example forms for pro se litigants,74 following 
the repeal of Rule 84 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
removal of the Appendix of Forms from the civil rule.75 Among those forms 
is a sample complaint form for pro se prisoner civil rights claims.76 That 
form complaint also substantially mirrors the original model form created 
nearly forty years ago. 
The widespread adoption of prisoner form complaints is not surprising. 
Scholars, practitioners, court employees, and pro se advocates have touted 
 
 
 69. Levy, supra note 20, at 505 n.127. 
 70. Fed. Judicial Ctr., Resource Guide for Managing Prisoner Civil Rights Litigation: With Special 
Emphasis on the Prison Litigation Reform Act 7 (1996) (“Well-designed forms and instructions both 
assist the court and provide prisoners with important information about court rules and procedures 
governing the filing and prosecution of civil cases in the district.”). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 107–116. 
 73. The two districts that do not have a form prisoner complaint are the Districts of Massachusetts 
and the Northern Marianas Islands. However, these two districts account for a very small fraction of the 
pro se prisoner complaints that are filed every year. For the twelve month period ending June 30, 2015, 
only fifty-seven prisoner civil rights complaints were filed in the District of Massachusetts, and only one 
prisoner civil rights complaint was filed in the District of the Northern Marianas Islands. ADMIN. OFFICE 
OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS tbl. C-3 (2015). 
 74. Pro Se Forms, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/pro-se-forms (last 
visited Dec. 17, 2016). 
 75. Rule 84, which created a standard appendix of model forms, was repealed because it was 
determined to be “no longer necessary.” FED. R. CIV. P. 84 advisory committee’s note to 2015 
amendment. The Advisory Committee explained that now “there are many alternative sources of forms, 
including the website of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the websites of many 
district courts,” and other sources. Id. 
 76. The form was most recently updated in December 2016. See Complaint for Violation of Civil 
Rights (Prisoner), ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS (2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/ pro-se-
forms/complaint-violation-civil-rights-prisoner [hereinafter AO 2016 Form Complaint].  
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standardized, fill-in-the-blank forms as an easy way to help pro se litigants 
and courts and have advocated for expanded use of standardized forms in 
all types of cases as a way of increasing access to justice.77  
II. RESEARCH RESULTS 
Despite the acclaim given to these form complaints, no one has 
conducted a comprehensive examination of the forms now in use to see if 
they fulfill their intended purpose. This Article fills that gap. We have 
collected and reviewed form complaints from each of the ninety-two federal 
districts we identified as providing them. We collected form complaints by 
visiting court websites, contacting district court clerks’ offices directly, and 
by searching PACER for sample form complaints from various districts. We 
then read each form and analyzed it with attention to the criteria we describe 
below.  
Our examination indicates that, while there are many ways in which the 
federal forms assist pro se prisoners in filing effective complaints and the 
courts in reviewing them, there are other ways in which the forms are 
inconsistent with governing law or impose unique or unwarranted pleading 
burdens not present in other litigation.  
To be sure, we do not think that form complaints should be discarded. 
Form complaints are valuable to courts and prisoner plaintiffs in several 
ways. They tend to provide clear, straightforward instructions.78 They often 
apprise prisoners of the risks of filing a nonmeritorious lawsuit, including 
that, if their case is dismissed, they may accrue “strikes” under the PLRA 
that can adversely affect their ability to file future lawsuits.79 They may 
inform prisoners that any action challenging their conviction or sentence 
must be brought as a habeas corpus petition or face dismissal.80 They 
strongly advise prisoners to focus on the specific facts of what happened, to 
include names, dates and events, and to identify exactly what relief they 
 
 
 77. See Rochelle Klempner, The Case for Court-Based Document Assembly Programs: A Review 
of the New York State Court System’s “DIY” Forms, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1189, 1214 (2014) 
(describing the New York court system’s adoption of a “Do it Yourself” program of offering 
standardized forms to pro se litigants and stating that the program has “assisted hundreds of thousands 
of unrepresented litigants over the past few years”); Swank, supra note 32, at 1554 (stating that pro se 
litigants who file the correct paperwork reduce the burdens of the courts adjudicating their claims).  
 78. However, even clear and simple instructions may be inaccessible to the average prisoner. See 
Klempner, supra note 77, at 1196 (noting that non-incarcerated pro se litigants frequently complain that 
standardized forms are difficult to understand and fill out correctly “due to confusing and complex 
language”). 
 79. See infra note 226 and accompanying text. 
 80. See infra note 217 and accompanying text.  
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seek. These instructions may help prisoners recognize the consequences of 
filing suit, and may help make their complaints more “decipherable” than 
the “verbose” and “unintelligible” narrative complaints that the committee 
designed the forms to address.81 But the forms’ problematic aspects should 
not go overlooked or uncorrected. If form complaints are going to be 
employed by the courts, they must be properly drafted.  
We identified three primary areas of concern: (1) forms that require 
prisoners to plead facts or issues that the law does not require them to plead; 
(2) forms that hinder prisoners from pleading sufficient facts about the 
nature of their claim so as to make it more difficult to withstand a motion to 
dismiss; and (3) forms that require prisoners to understand legal language 
or to draw legal conclusions based on terminology that they may not 
understand. Pro se prisoners may suffer significant adverse consequences as 
a result, including premature dismissal of potentially meritorious claims. 
Courts may face the additional burden of reconciling misdirected pleadings 
with governing law.  We have summarized our results below.  
 
ISSUE 
NUMBER OF 
DISTRICTS 
PERCENTAGE 
OF DISTRICTS 
Prisoners must plead exhaustion of 
administrative remedies 
71 77% 
Prisoners must plead prior litigation history 78 85% 
Prisoners are instructed to plead facts 
“briefly” or “as briefly as possible” 
67 73% 
Prisoners must not cite legal authority 
 
67 73% 
Prisoners are discouraged or limited from 
using additional pages in the complaint, or are 
given ambiguous instructions about using 
additional sheets 
24 26% 
Prisoners are forbidden or limited in including 
attachments or exhibits 
9 10% 
Prisoners must plead whether defendant acted 
under color of state law 
16 17% 
Prisoners must plead whether defendant is 
sued in an individual or official capacity 
14 16% 
 
 
 81. See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text.  
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A. Pleading Facts that the Law Does Not Require Plaintiffs to Plead 
Most common among these factors are requirements that prisoner 
plaintiffs plead facts the law does not require. In particular, form complaints 
require plaintiffs to plead facts related to the PLRA-created affirmative 
defenses of administrative exhaustion and the three-strikes bar. Seventy-one 
complaints—77 percent—require prisoners to plead facts regarding 
exhaustion of administrative remedies.82 Seventy-eight complaints—nearly 
85 percent—ask for prisoners’ prior litigation history.83 Some ask for all 
prior litigation filed while the prisoner was incarcerated;84 others ask only 
for prior litigation related to the facts of the present lawsuit.85 Additionally, 
a small number of form complaints require prisoners to provide 
documentation of administrative grievances filed or prior lawsuits.86 
B. Impeding Plaintiffs from Pleading Facts Sufficient to Survive a Motion 
to Dismiss 
A significant number of form complaints impose restrictions that make 
it more difficult for prisoners to plead a factually sufficient complaint by 
 
 
 82. The sample form recently released by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts also asks 
about exhaustion. See AO 2016 Form Complaint, supra note 76, at 6–8. 
 83. The Administrative Office’s Form Complaint does likewise. See id. at 9–10. 
 84. See, e.g., Form Complaint (E.D.N.C), http://www.nced.uscourts.gov/pdfs/forms/ 
prisonerCivilRightsComplaintPackage.pdf; Form Complaint (E.D. Tex.), at 2, http://www.txed. 
uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/view_document.cgi?document=25225; Form Complaint (N.D. Miss.), at 2, 
http://www.msnd.uscourts.gov/sites/msnd/files/5a_complaints_1983_prisoner_final.pdf.  
 85. See, e.g., Form Complaint (W.D. Pa.), http://www.pawd.uscourts.gov/sites/pawd/files/ 
prisonercivilrights.pdf; Form Complaint (W.D. Ky.), at 3, http://www.kywd.uscourts.gov/sites/ 
kywd/files/forms/1983_Prisoner_Packet_2.pdf; Form Complaint (E.D. Ark.), http://www.are.uscourts. 
gov/sites/ared/files/42usc1983.pdf. 
 86. See, e.g., Form Complaint (W.D.N.Y.), at 4, http://www.nywd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/ 
files/PrisonerComplaintForm.pdf; Form Complaint (W.D. La.), at 2, http://www.lawd.uscourts.gov/ 
sites/default/files/UPLOADS/LAWD_Civil_Rights_Complaint_Prisoner_0.pdf (requiring inmates to 
attach copies to the prison’s responses to the inmate’s grievances and the resulting dispositions); Form 
Complaint (N.D. Tex.); Form Complaint (E.D. KY.); Form Complaint (S.D. Ill.), at 4, 
http://www.ilsd.uscourts.gov/Forms/PrisonerCivilRightsComplaint.pdf; Form Complaint (D. Minn.), at 
5, http://www.mnd.uscourts.gov/Pro-Se/ProSeForms/ProSe-Civil-Rights-Complaint.pdf (requiring 
inmate plaintiffs to attach the prison’s disposition of the inmate’s grievance); Form Complaint (W.D. 
Mo.), http://www.mow.uscourts.gov/district/pro_se_fillable_forms/Pro%20Se/Fillable_Pro_Se_ 
Complaint_Form_Prisoner.pdf (asking inmates to attach grievance dispositions); Form Complaint (C.D. 
Cal.), at 2, http://court.cacd.uscourts.gov/CACD/Forms.nsf/Forms (open “Pro Se Packets” and follow 
link 4, “Prisoner Civil Rights Packet”); Form Complaint (W.D. Wash.), at 3, 
http://www.wawd.uscourts.gov/sites/wawd/files/1983CivilRightsComplaintRev4-8-2013.pdf 
(requiring inmates to attach the final disposition on the grievance); Form Complaint (D.N.M.), at 4, 
http://www.nmd.uscourts.gov/sites/nmd/files/forms/PrisonerCivilComplaintForm.pdf; see also Form 
Complaint (E.D.N.C.), supra note 84 (requiring inmates to attach a sworn affidavit attesting that all 
administrative remedies have been exhausted). 
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restricting the plaintiff’s allegations. Sixty-seven complaints—73 percent—
direct prisoner plaintiffs to limit their allegations to a “brief” description of 
facts or to state the facts “as briefly as possible.”87 As explained below, in 
light of the changes to pleading standards following Iqbal and Twombly, 
this instruction may cause plaintiffs to plead the kind of conclusory 
allegations that the Supreme Court has found inadequate.  
Relatedly, in some cases, prisoners may want to attach documentation to 
their complaints to bolster or clarify the substance of the wrongs they claim. 
These attachments may include grievances, prison responses to grievances, 
or other documentation. Five complaints prohibit prisoners from attaching 
additional documents.88 Two permit exhibits but discourage prisoners from 
using them.89 Two complaints place a page limit on the number of 
attachments that can be included.90 By contrast—and perhaps recognizing 
the clarity additional documentation can bring to pro se allegations—the 
complaints used in a few districts encourage plaintiffs to provide supporting 
documentation.91 
Of course, the forms necessarily can only provide a limited amount of 
space for prisoners to describe their factual allegations. However, while a 
number of forms expressly permit prisoners to add additional pages if they 
run out of space, five restrict plaintiffs from exceeding the space provided.92 
Eight complaints place a limit on the number of pages the plaintiff can 
 
 
 87. The Administrative Office’s new form complaint also directs plaintiffs to state the facts “as 
briefly as possible,” but allows attachment of additional pages if needed. AO 2016 Form Complaint, 
supra note 76, at 4. 
 88. Form Complaint (E.D.N.C.), supra note 84 (prohibiting attachments unless instructed by 
court); Form Complaint (E.D. La.), http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/forms/1983.pdf 
(prohibiting attachments); Form Complaint (M.D. La.), http://www.lamd.uscourts.gov/ 
sites/default/files/forms/1983COMPLAINTFORM-REVISED2014.pdf (prohibiting attachments); 
Form Complaint (S.D. Iowa), http://www.iasd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/forms/Prisoner% 
201983%20Civil%20Rights%20Complaint%20Packet%209-19-2013.pdf (prohibiting attachments); 
Form Complaint (D. Ariz.), at 2, http://www.azd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/forms/Civil% 
20Rights%20Complaint%20instructions-form.pdf (prohibiting attachments but also informing inmates 
that information from attachments should be paraphrased in the complaint).  
 89. Form Complaint (E.D. Wis.), http://www.wied.uscourts.gov/sites/wied/files/documents/ 
forms/Civil%20Right%20Complaint%20and%20Guide%20-%20Prisoner.pdf (encouraging plaintiffs 
to limit themselves to the space provided but allowing them to submit additional sheets or documents). 
 90. The District of Idaho limits prisoners to 25 pages of exhibits. Form Complaint (D. Idaho), 
https://www.id.uscourts.gov/Content_Fetcher/index.cfml/Prisoner_Complaint_Form_860.pdf?Content
_ID=860. 
 91. See, e.g., Form Complaint (S.D. Ill.), supra note 86, at 5 (instructing plaintiffs that when 
describing the facts of the claim, “You should also attach any relevant, supporting documentation.”). 
 92. See infra note 172 and accompanying text. Some variation exists in the way that the complaints 
prohibit or discourage the use of additional sheets. Some expressly prohibit additional sheets. Others use 
language that strongly discourages the use of additional sheets.  
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attach.93 Seven additional complaints use ambiguous language to imply that 
a prisoner may only attach one extra page.94 Four complaints that allow 
additional pages are ambiguous as to whether they can be used only for 
raising additional claims or naming additional defendants or can include 
additional facts regarding the plaintiff’s claims.95 Some complaints do not 
specify whether additional pages are allowed or prohibited.96 
Finally, sixty-seven complaints direct plaintiffs not to include any legal 
argument or citation in their allegations.97  
C. Using Legal Terminology 
A relatively small number of complaints require pro se prisoners to 
understand and draw conclusions from legal terminology. Sixteen 
complaints direct the prisoner to indicate whether the defendants were 
acting “under color of law” and, if so, to explain how. Fifteen complaints 
direct the prisoner to indicate whether the defendants are being sued in their 
individual capacity or their official capacity. Finally, four complaints 
contain short statements of legal principles that are likely intended to 
provide helpful guidance to prisoners, but in fact may not be fully accurate 
or are potentially misleading when applied to certain causes of action.  
We discuss the implications of these results in the following Part. 
 
 
 93. For example, the Middle District of Pennsylvania restricts plaintiffs to three additional sheets. 
Form Complaint (M.D. Pa.), at 2, http://www.pamd.uscourts.gov/sites/ default/files/complain.pdf. The 
Western District of Texas form states that the entire complaint, including attachments and additional 
sheets, cannot exceed 20 pages. Form Complaint (W.D. Tex.). The Middle District of Alabama, the 
District of Kansas and the Northern District of Oklahoma each allow only two additional sheets for 
providing additional factual allegations relating to the plaintiff’s claims. Form Complaint (M.D. Ala.), 
http://www.almd.uscourts.gov/forms/inmate-1983-complaint-instruction-sheet; Form Complaint (D. 
Kan.), http://www.ksd.uscourts.gov/complaint-civil-rights-421983/; Form Complaint (N.D. Okla.), at 2, 
https://www.oknd.uscourts.gov/prisoner (follow “Civil Rights Complaint Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(PR-01)” hyperlink). See infra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 94. See, e.g., Form Complaint (D. Me.) (stating that prisoners may attach “extra sheet” if 
necessary); Form Complaint (D.R.I.) (“Attach an extra sheet if necessary.”); Form Complaint (D.N.J.), 
http://www.njd.uscourts.gov/sites/njd/files/forms/DNJ-ProSe-006.pdf (“Attach a separate sheet if 
necessary.”); Form Complaint (D. Neb.) (same); Form Complaint (S.D. Iowa), supra note 88 (“Attach 
an extra sheet, if necessary . . . .”). The form for the District Court for the District of Columbia states in 
one place that “[i]f you need additional space to answer a question, you may use an additional blank 
page,” but also states later on the form that prisoners may “[a]ttach extra sheets, if necessary.” Form 
Complaint (D.D.C.), http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/sites/dcd/files/CompCivilRights42usc1983.pdf. 
 95. See infra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 96. See, e.g., Form Complaint (N.D. Cal.), http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/filelibrary/ 
30/Complaint_under_Civil_Rights_Act-42-USC-1983-P.pdf; Form Complaint (D. Nev.), 
http://www.nvd.uscourts.gov/Files/42.1983%20Civil%20Rights%20Complaint.pdf. 
 97. See infra Part. III.B.4. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
918 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 94:899 
 
 
 
 
III. CONSEQUENCES FOR PRO SE PRISONER PLAINTIFFS 
By requiring pro se prisoners to plead facts that the law does not require 
them to plead, restricting pro se prisoners from providing detailed factual 
allegations, and directing pro se prisoners to plead legal conclusions, many 
form complaints impose a heightened pleading standard not faced by other 
litigants. The consequences of these impediments may be significant and 
can include the expenditure of judicial resources on reconciling the 
complaint with the law, improper or premature dismissal of the lawsuit, 
imposition of financial or other sanctions, and accrual of “strikes” under the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act that could bar a prisoner from filing any future 
civil lawsuits. This part discusses the consequences stemming from each of 
the three categories identified above. 
A. Requiring Plaintiffs to Plead Facts That the Law Does Not Require 
Most form complaints require prisoner plaintiffs to plead facts that the 
law does not require them to plead. These facts are often the basis for 
affirmative defenses under the PLRA. Specifically, many complaints 
require plaintiffs to plead facts regarding (a) whether they have exhausted 
their administrative remedies, and (b) their prior litigation history. Because 
each requirement presents different implications for prisoners, each is 
discussed separately. 
1. Pleading Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 
a. Requiring Pro Se Prisoners to Plead Exhaustion Risks 
Premature Dismissal of their Complaints 
Seventy-one of the ninety-two complaints require prisoners to provide 
information about whether they exhausted administrative remedies before 
filing. The sample form complaint that the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts recently released also requires prisoners to plead facts about 
exhaustion.98 Typically, the complaints ask if there is a grievance procedure 
at the correctional institution, whether the prisoner filed a grievance, 
whether the prisoner appealed the grievance through all available levels, 
whether the grievance process has been completed, and the result.99 They 
also typically ask the prisoner to explain why he did not exhaust his 
 
 
 98. See 2016 AO Form Complaint, supra note 76, at 6–8. 
 99. See, e.g., Form Complaint (M.D. Pa.), supra note 93, at 2. 
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remedies if he did not follow all the steps of an available grievance 
process.100 
The law is settled, however, that exhaustion of administrative remedies 
is not part of the prisoner’s prima facie case and need not be pleaded. Rather, 
it is an affirmative defense and the defendant’s obligation—on penalty of 
waiver—to raise and prove.101 In 2007, the Supreme Court in Jones v. Bock 
held that exhaustion is an affirmative defense and that prisoners do not have 
to plead facts regarding exhaustion in their complaints.102 Before Jones, the 
circuits had split on whether exhaustion was an affirmative defense.103 But 
the forms asking about exhaustion do not come only from circuits that 
treated administrative exhaustion as a pleading requirement pre-Jones.104 
Moreover, ten years after Jones was decided, 77 percent of form complaints 
still require prisoners to plead exhaustion. These forms are wrong on the 
law, and the error they include may cause unintended negative 
consequences for prisoner plaintiffs and the courts.  
First, requiring prisoners to plead facts about exhaustion creates a risk 
that complaints that might otherwise be heard on the merits will end up 
being dismissed on exhaustion grounds. Exhaustion, like other affirmative 
defenses, can be waived by a defendant.105 Thus, if a defendant does not 
raise exhaustion, the plaintiff’s action can proceed even if the plaintiff failed 
to exhaust administrative remedies.106 Requiring a plaintiff to plead 
exhaustion makes that defense part of the plaintiff’s complaint and requires 
the court to resolve how that information should be considered.  
Second, the plaintiff may have arguments to defeat an administrative 
exhaustion defense that are not reflected by checking a box “yes” or “no.” 
Because the PLRA only requires exhaustion of “available” administrative 
remedies, a prisoner is not required to exhaust when the prison acts in a way 
 
 
 100. See, e.g., id.; Form Complaint (D. Or.), at 8–9, https://www.ord.uscourts.gov/index.php/ 
component/phocadownload/category/9-habeas-corpus-and-prisoner-civil-rights?download=24:prisoner 
-civil-rights-complaint; 1976 REPORT, supra note 16, at 47.  
 101. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b); see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215–16 (2007).  
 102. Bock, 549 U.S. at 215–16. 
 103. Id. at 204 & n.2 (describing circuit split). 
 104. See, e.g., Form Complaint (D. Vt.); Form Complaint (M.D. Pa.), supra note 93, at 2; Form 
Complaint (E.D.N.C.), supra note 84, at 8; Form Complaint (N.D. Ind.), at 4, 
http://www.innd.uscourts.gov/sites/innd/files/PrCmplnt.pdf; Form Complaint (D. Minn.), supra note 86, 
at 5; Form Complaint (E.D. Cal.), at 3–5, http://www.caed.uscourts.gov/caednew/assets/File/ 
Prisoner%20PAcket.pdf. 
 105. See, e.g., Johnson v. Testman, 380 F.3d 691, 695 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that the PLRA’s 
exhaustion requirement “is waivable”). 
 106. See, e.g., Handberry v. Thompson, 446 F.3d 335, 342–43 (2d Cir. 2006); Anderson v. XYZ 
Correctional Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 679–80 (4th Cir. 2005); Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 
641, 647 n.3 (3d Cir. 2002); Randolph v. Rogers, 253 F.3d 342, 347 n.11 (8th Cir. 2001). 
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to make administrative remedies unavailable.107 Failure to exhaust may 
indicate that the prisoner was impeded or prevented from filing a grievance 
or that grievance procedures were not otherwise “available” within the 
meaning of the PLRA.108 Thus, an unsophisticated plaintiff may answer 
“no” and be held to that verified statement even if administrative remedies 
were not “available.” If such facts are presented outside of the complaint, 
the court must resolve that discrepancy. 
Third, merely having such questions on the complaint form may affect 
how a court interprets the complaint. A prisoner who does not know whether 
an administrative remedy was “available” or who simply may not 
understand what the complaint is asking may end up leaving the question 
blank. Some district courts have treated the failure to answer as the 
equivalent of answering “no,” resulting in a conclusion that the prisoner 
failed to exhaust and dismissal of the claim.109 An equivalent silence in a 
complaint that does not ask about exhaustion would not lead to the same 
result.  
Finally, there are several ways in which a seemingly simple question 
about exhaustion may be misconstrued. In one of the few cases addressing 
this issue, the Second Circuit noted three ways in which one pro se form 
could cause error: (1) the form asks only whether there is a grievance 
procedure, not whether the procedure is applicable to the subject of the 
plaintiff’s claims; (2) the form asks if there is a grievance procedure “in the 
institution,” which may confuse a prisoner who has been transferred from a 
prison without a grievance procedure to one that does have a procedure in 
 
 
 107. See, e.g., Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809–12 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that failure to 
exhaust is excusable if prison officials engage in affirmative misconduct that impedes the completion of 
the grievance process); Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2001) (“We believe that a remedy 
that prison officials prevent a prisoner from ‘utiliz[ing]’ is not an ‘available’ remedy” under the PLRA); 
Marr v. Fields, No. 1:07-cv-494, 2008 WL 828788, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 27, 2008) (refusing to 
dismiss action where plaintiff alleged this prison officials told him that his claim could not be grieved).  
 108. See Chandler, 438 F.3d at 809–12; Miller, 247 F.3d at 740; Marr, 2008 WL 828788, at *6. 
Some complaints have different wording but carry the same risk. Some complaints ask simply if the 
prisoner exhausted administrative remedies. The prisoner might answer no and have the complaint 
dismissed, but the reason may be because no administrative remedies were available. 
 109. See, e.g., Ghee v. Ramos, No. 13 Civ. 632(RWS), 2013 WL 7018543, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 
4, 2013) (dismissing prisoner's complaint for failure to exhaust where he left blank the question 
regarding his appeal efforts and failed to allege “further actions taken . . . to appeal his initial grievance 
or comply with the remaining requirements under the [grievance program]”); Antrobus v. Warden of 
GRVC, No. 11 Civ. 5128(JMF), 2012 WL 1900542, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2012) (treating prisoner's 
nonresponsive answer regarding his appeal efforts on form complaint as “a concession that he did not 
attempt to appeal the decision at all”). But see Groenow v. Williams, No. 13 Civ. 3961(PAC)(JLC), 
2014 WL 941276, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2014) (“Where a prisoner indicates that he has taken some 
steps toward exhaustion, district courts will not normally infer from his silence as to any remaining steps 
that he has not fully exhausted.”). 
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place; and (3) the form does not allow a prisoner to say that he does not 
know if a grievance procedure exists. Error on any one of these factors could 
cause a prisoner to unknowingly—and incorrectly—plead himself out of 
court.110 The court is left to determine the proper interpretation of a 
prisoner’s answer to a form’s ambiguous question. 
Additionally, prisoners risk improper dismissal by not having copies of 
their grievances and administrative decisions, which some districts require 
prisoners to attach to their complaints.111 This requirement is troubling, not 
just because it goes beyond what the law requires, but also because there are 
any number of reasons why prisoners might not have the required 
documentation to show exhaustion. Photocopies cost money that many 
prisoners do not have. Prisoners have limited space in their cells to store 
legal papers.112 Documents easily can get lost when prisoners are transferred 
to another cell or another institution or be destroyed by other inmates.113 
Although a district court judge may choose to overlook a plaintiff’s failure 
to attach supporting documentation, that judge would be within his or her 
authority to reject the complaint for non-compliance and dismiss the 
action.114 Alternatively, the prisoner’s case may never reach the court 
 
 
 110. Snider v. Melindez, 199 F.3d 108, 114 n.3 (2d Cir. 1999). The court noted, “[w]e do not mean 
to suggest by these observations that such forms and questionnaires have no utility. They may usefully 
guide the court’s inquiry as to whether the prisoner has fulfilled the prerequisites to suit; however, a 
plaintiff's answers cannot by themselves establish the existence of an administrative remedy.” Id. 
 111. Form Complaint (W.D.N.Y.), supra note 86, at 4; Form Complaint (W.D. La.), supra note 86, 
at 2 (requiring copies of grievance responses and dispositions); Form Complaint (N.D. Miss.), supra 
note 84, at 4 (requiring prisoners to attach copies of all grievances and dispositions); Form Complaint 
(E.D. Ky.) (requiring prisoners to submit a copy of each grievance and the response to the grievance); 
Form Complaint (S.D. Ill.), supra note 86, at 4 (directing plaintiff to attach any grievance response and 
dispositions or to explain why such documents were not attached to the complaint); Form Complaint (D. 
Minn.), supra note 86, at 5 (instructing plaintiffs to “[a]ttach a copy of the decision or disposition 
received from the prison grievance procedure”); Form Complaint (C.D. Cal.), supra note 86, at 2 (asking 
plaintiff to attach copies of grievance decisions); Form Complaint (W.D. Wash.), supra note 86, at 3 
(requiring prisoner to attach a copy of the final decision on the grievance); Form Complaint (D.N.M.), 
supra note 86, at 4 (requiring plaintiff to attach “proof of exhaustion”); see also Form Complaint 
(E.D.N.C.), supra note 84 (requiring that the plaintiff file a sworn affidavit that all administrative 
remedies have been exhausted). 
 112. See, e.g., Thompson v. DEA, 492 F.3d 428, 435 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting that prisoners “often 
lack the ability to gather and store” numerous legal pleadings); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 
n.9 (9th Cir. 2005) (“In his current facility, [the prisoner] represents that he is permitted only six cubic 
feet of possessions—and that this not enough space to maintain comprehensive files.”). 
 113. See, e.g., Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 604 (6th Cir. 2002) (addressing prisoner’s claim that 
prison guards unlawfully retaliated against him by seizing and destroying his legal papers); see also 
Woods v. Carey, No. CIV S-04-1225 LKK GGH P, 2007 WL 2688819, at *1–2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 
2007) (acknowledging prisoner’s claim that he was unable to file a timely appeal of his administrative 
grievance because he lacked access to his legal papers). 
 114. See, e.g., Daily v. Municipality of Adams Cty., 117 F. App’x 669 (10th Cir. 2004) (affirming 
dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint for failure to use the complaint form and for failing to provide all the 
information that the form required). 
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because the additional burden of supplying documentation may itself deter 
prisoners from filing suit.  
This argument is not simply that a case that will ultimately be dismissed 
should be dismissed more slowly. As the Supreme Court held in Jones, the 
PLRA does not authorize or justify a departure from normal practices under 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which require that a defendant raise 
all affirmative defenses.115 The wisdom of this rule is evident in this context. 
Defendants have “superior access to prison administrative records in 
comparison to prisoners”116 and know the procedures available in their 
institutions. Requiring defendants to raise an exhaustion issue ensures that 
the prisoner plaintiff is on notice of, and can respond to, the precise defects 
that the defendants assert. It also allows the courts to decide affirmative 
defenses on a record created by both parties.  
b. Requiring Prisoners to Plead Exhaustion Risks Improper 
Accrual of PLRA Strikes.  
For a prisoner plaintiff, the cost of dismissal on the pleadings is more 
than simply the end of his case. It can also impair or prevent that prisoner 
from filing any future cases. Under the PLRA’s three-strikes rule, a prisoner 
who has filed three prior actions or appeals that have been “dismissed on 
the grounds that” they are “frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted” is prohibited from proceeding in forma 
pauperis (IFP) in any future lawsuit, unless the prisoner is in imminent 
danger of serious bodily injury.117 Because most prisoners are indigent and 
 
 
 115. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 214 (2007). In other contexts, courts have expressed concern 
about district courts raising defenses sua sponte that a defendant has chosen to waive or may choose to 
waive. See, e.g., Barrera v. Young, 794 F.2d 1264, 1269 (7th Cir. 1986) (“If a state authorizes its 
Attorney General to surrender the protection of some principle of law on behalf of the state, no principle 
of federal law interferes. To the contrary, if the federal court refused to accept the waiver, explicit or 
implicit, by the state through its Attorney General, this would be a meddlesome intrusion into the state’s 
internal allocation of governmental authority.”). 
 116. Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119 (citing Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 117. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2012). Although the statute provides an exception where the prisoner is 
in “imminent danger of serious bodily injury,” that provision has been construed narrowly. “Imminent 
danger” must be present “as of the time the prisoner’s complaint is filed,” and “a prisoner’s allegation 
that he faced danger in the past is insufficient to allow him to proceed I.F.P.” Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 
239 F.3d 307, 310 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc). Moreover, the exception has been construed to apply only 
to particularly acute injuries, as injuries that linger for a longer period of time not found to be 
“imminent.” See, e.g., Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 468 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Moreover, even if poor care 
for her past injuries, her eyesight, or her arthritis may prove detrimental to Ball's health over time, they 
do not represent ‘imminent dangers’ which are ‘about to occur at any moment or are impending.’” (citing 
Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 315). Furthermore, many prisoner civil rights claims, such as due process and 
First Amendment claims, ordinarily do not involve a risk of bodily injury.  
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cannot afford to pay the $400.00 district court filing fee up front, barring a 
prisoner from proceeding IFP is tantamount to barring that prisoner from 
court altogether. Courts considering a prisoner’s IFP application must 
review the disposition of prior actions to determine whether three strikes 
have been collected. 
Notably, PLRA strikes are tied to dismissals, not to grants of summary 
judgment. In other words, a dismissal for failure to state a claim counts as a 
strike,118 but an order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants 
ordinarily does not.119 That distinction is important when considered in 
relation to the form complaint. Because affirmative defenses such as 
exhaustion are ordinarily raised and proved by the defendant, they are 
typically resolved at the summary judgment stage after the parties have an 
opportunity to submit evidence showing that the plaintiff exhausted or failed 
to exhaust administrative remedies.120 There is a narrow exception, 
however, that allows affirmative defenses like exhaustion to be resolved on 
a motion to dismiss if the affirmative defense is clear on the face of the 
complaint.121 In other words, exhaustion may be resolved on the pleadings 
only if the plaintiff includes facts that demonstrate a failure to exhaust. In 
prisoner cases, where the court reviews a complaint to determine if it is 
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim before defendants are served, 
exhaustion may be resolved on the complaint alone, without a responsive 
pleading. Several circuits have held that such a dismissal counts as a strike 
for PLRA purposes, particularly if the dismissal is with prejudice.122 
 
 
 118. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); see also Ball, 726 F.3d at 460 (concluding that an action is a strike where 
it is dismissed for failure to state a claim). 
 119. See, e.g., Tolbert v. Stevenson, 635 F.3d 646, 654–55 (4th Cir. 2011) (stating that order 
granting summary judgment is not a strike). But cf. Blakely v. Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(en banc) (finding that a ruling on summary judgment can be a strike if the court states that the action, 
on summary judgment, was dismissed as frivolous, malicious or for failure to state a claim). 
 120. See, e.g., Ball, 726 F.3d at 460 (quoting Thompson v. DEA, 492 F.3d 428, 438 (D.C. Cir. 
2007)) (noting that in the majority of cases, exhaustion will not be resolved at the motion to dismiss 
stage but at some later stage of the litigation); Groenow v. Williams, No. 13 Civ. 3961(PAC)(JLC), 2014 
WL 941276, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2014) (noting that “a motion for summary judgment is normally 
the proper vehicle to address a plaintiff’s failure to exhaust”). 
 121. Ball, 726 F.3d at 459; Thompson, 492 F.3d at 438. See also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 
(2007) (explaining that whether a court can grant a motion to dismiss on the ground of an affirmative 
defense depends on whether the plaintiff pleads facts showing that the affirmative defense applies). 
 122. See Ball, 726 F.3d at 459–60; Thompson, 492 F.3d at 438; Steele v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 
355 F.3d 1204, 1213 (10th Cir. 2003); Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 731 (11th Cir. 1998) (counting 
dismissal for failure to exhaust as a strike because “[a] claim that fails to allege the requisite exhaustion 
of remedies is tantamount to one that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted”); see also 
Owens v. Isaac, 487 F.3d 561, 563 (8th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (finding that a dismissal for failure to 
exhaust was not a strike where the dismissal was without prejudice); Snider v. Melindez, 199 F.3d 108, 
111 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that the three strikes rule “was intended to apply to nonmeritorious suits 
dismissed with prejudice, not suits dismissed without prejudice for failure to comply with a procedural 
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Thus, requiring prisoners to plead exhaustion in the complaint, which 
might then cause exhaustion to be addressed at the dismissal or screening 
stage rather than at summary judgment, puts them at risk of accruing strikes 
that otherwise would not accrue.123 For example, in Ball v. Famiglio, the 
plaintiff Dawn Ball had filed a prior lawsuit claiming civil rights violations 
by prison employees and officials at a Pennsylvania state prison. She filed 
that prior action in the Middle District of Pennsylvania using the prisoner 
form complaint required by the Middle District’s Local Rules.124 The form 
asked her to indicate (1) whether she filed a grievance and (2) whether that 
grievance process had been completed.125 Ball checked “yes” for the first 
question and “no” for the second question.126 This effectively made the 
exhaustion affirmative defense part of Ball’s complaint. Thus, when the 
district court found that she had not exhausted her administrative remedies, 
it dismissed her action for failure to state a claim.127  
When Ball filed a subsequent civil rights lawsuit and appeal, the Third 
Circuit found that she was ineligible to proceed IFP because the prior 
dismissal was her third strike.128 But had it not been for the form complaint’s 
requirement that she plead exhaustion, her claim would not have been 
subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.129 Instead, exhaustion would 
have been addressed, as it normally is, at summary judgment, and Ball 
would not have accrued a strike. 
 
 
prerequisite,” such as exhaustion, and holding that the plaintiff’s prior dismissal without prejudice for 
failure to exhaust was not a strike). 
 123. The PLRA requires courts to pre-screen complaints even prior to considering a defendant’s 
motion to dismiss. The statute  states that the court “shall review” a prisoner complaint, either before 
docketing or “as soon as practicable” after docketing and shall either identify the prisoner’s cognizable 
claims or dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary 
relief from a defendant that is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See also, Broc Gullett, Note, 
Eliminating Standard Pleading Forms That Require Prisoners to Allege Their Exhaustion of 
Administrative Remedies, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1179 (arguing that requiring prisoners to plead 
exhaustion is inconsistent with Jones v. Bock and causes prisoners to improperly accrue PLRA strikes). 
 124. See MIDDLE DIST. PA. LOCAL R. 4.7(A) (2014). In the interest of full disclosure, one co-author 
served as court-appointed Amicus Curiae on Ms. Ball’s behalf before the Third Circuit. For another 
article that discusses Ms. Ball’s case, see Gullett, supra note 123, at 1200–03. 
 125. See Form Complaint (M.D. Pa.), supra note 93, at 2; Ball, 726 F.3d at 466.  
 126. Complaint at 1, Ball v. SCI-Muncy, No. 1:08-cv-00391-YK-LQ (M.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2008). 
 127. Ball, 726 F.3d at 466. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is not an independent ground 
for a strike under the PLRA. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 
 128. See id. 
 129. Of course, it is always possible that a complaint is wrongly dismissed for failure to exhaust 
could end up being dismissed on other grounds. In that case, the action would constitute a strike even if 
the plaintiff would not have been required to plead exhaustion. See Groenow v. Williams, No. 13 Civ. 
3961(PAC)(JLC), 2014 WL 941276, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2014) (recommending that the district 
court deny the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust but also recommending that the court 
grant the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on the merits). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/7
  
 
 
 
 
2016] PRISONERS AND PLEADING 925 
 
 
 
 
Requiring prisoner plaintiffs to plead exhaustion is contrary to governing 
law and imposes risks that prisoners will have their complaints prematurely 
dismissed and receive a PLRA strike that they would not otherwise receive. 
It also puts courts in the position of deciding exhaustion on an incomplete 
and one-sided record or ignoring an issue raised by the plaintiff’s complaint.  
2. Prior Litigation History 
Seventy-eight form complaints, as well as the Administrative Office’s 
recently created sample form, require prisoners to provide some information 
about prior lawsuits they have filed. Courts have good reasons for being 
interested in a prisoner plaintiff’s prior litigation history. Identifying prior 
lawsuits, their current status, and the judges to whom they are assigned, can 
help ensure that cases involving the same prisoners or issues are heard by a 
single judge.130 It also can help courts determine whether a prisoner has 
collected three strikes and is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis.131 
But including prior litigation history as a pleading requirement is improper 
and may cause prisoners, through inadvertence or mistake, to suffer 
sanctions or to have potentially meritorious claims dismissed for errors in 
completing this portion of the form. 
Requiring prisoners to plead facts about their prior litigation in their 
complaint is inconsistent with federal pleading rules. The Supreme Court 
has repeatedly held that rules requiring plaintiffs to plead facts beyond a 
“short and plain statement” of the claim run afoul of Rule 8 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.132 More importantly, the prevailing view is that 
 
 
 130. This appears to be the rationale for why prior litigation history was included in the original 
model form complaint recommended by the FJC committee in the 1970s. See supra note 52 and 
accompanying text.  
 131. As one district court opined,  
The information in Section IV of the complaint [regarding prior lawsuits] is useful to the court 
in enforcing the ‘three strikes’ provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The information on the form 
also assists the court in determining whether the action is related to or should be considered in 
connection with another action, or whether a holding in another action affects the current action. 
Further, since prisoner plaintiffs generally proceed pro se, the information helps the court 
determine their litigation experience and familiarity with the legal terrain of the current action. 
Requiring disclosure of previously filed cases on the complaint form relieves the court of the 
time-consuming task of combing the dockets of state and federal courts to identify cases 
previously filed by the plaintiff. This administrative benefit would be lost if plaintiffs were 
relieved of the obligation of identifying all previously filed cases.  
Snell v. Tucker, No. 3:13cv563/LAC/EMT, 2014 WL 866505, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2014) (citation 
omitted).  
 132. See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 
163, 168–69 (1993) (holding that courts cannot impose a heightened pleading requirement for § 1983 
actions because such a requirement is inconsistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)); see also Jones v. Bock, 
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the PLRA’s three-strikes rule is not a pleading requirement and does not 
require prisoners to demonstrate in their complaint that they are not barred 
by the three-strikes rule.133 
The risk of a pro se plaintiff mistakenly stating her litigation history 
outweighs the administrative benefit of this requirement today. When the 
model complaint was first developed in the 1970s, there was no electronic 
filing or PACER.134 At that time, having the prisoner identify his or her prior 
cases could save a court a substantial amount of time that would otherwise 
be spent combing through paper records to see if that prisoner had other 
pending cases. Now, that function can be performed in a matter of seconds 
through a simple PACER search. In fact, many courts already search 
PACER or a national three-strikes database when they receive a prisoner 
case to assess the prisoner’s accuracy in identifying his or her prior litigation 
history.135 
When prisoners have failed to provide their full litigation history, or have 
omitted particular details, courts have imposed a variety of sanctions, 
 
 
549 U.S. 199, 212–16 (2007) (finding that under Rule 8, prisoners do not have to plead exhaustion and 
that the PLRA did not alter standard pleading rules). The Seventh Circuit on several occasions has noted, 
without directly addressing the issue, that local rules requiring plaintiffs to use form complaints may be 
in tension with Rule 8. See, e.g., Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551, 553–54 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Whether 
mandatory forms are consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 is a subject we need not explore.”); Skenandore 
v. Litscher, 221 F.3d 1339 (7th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision) (“Although we recognize that 
there may be tension between the requirements of Rule 8(a) and Local Rule 12.02 [requiring form 
complaints], we have no occasion in this case to resolve this question.”). 
 133. Thompson v. DEA, 492 F.3d 428, 434 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“IFP prisoners need not plead 
compliance with section 1915(g) . . . .”); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote 
omitted) (“Congress did not require prisoners to declare that § 1915(g) does not bar their request to 
proceed IFP. Had Congress intended to require prisoners to affirmatively show that they were not subject 
to the three strikes provision, we have no doubt that it would have included that requirement in the list 
of requirements prisoners must address in order to obtain IFP status.”).  
 134. PACER, which stands for Public Access to Court Electronic Records, allows anyone to access 
records from a case in federal court electronically. See PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT ELECTRONIC 
RECORDS, www.pacer.gov (last visited Sept. 4, 2016). 
 135. See, e.g., Hoskins v. Dart, 633 F.3d 541, 543 (7th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (noting that the 
district court discovered the plaintiff’s omission of his litigation history when it “screened” his current 
complaints); Redmon v. Lake Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 414 F. App’x 221, 224 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that 
the district court issued an order to show cause directing the plaintiff to show why he omitted his 
litigation history and identified a prior case in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado that 
the plaintiff had not listed in his complaint); Mann v. Churchwell, No. 5:13cv175-WS, 2014 WL 84695 
at *2 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 9, 2014) (stating that an independent review of the plaintiff’s litigation history by 
the clerk of court revealed cases that the plaintiff had not identified); Myrick v. Martin, No. 
3:14cv77/LAC/EMT, 2014 WL 1744156, at *2 (N.D. Fla. May 1, 2014) (same); see also Fletcher v. 
Menard Corr. Ctr., 623 F.3d 1171, 1173 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that courts “can take judicial notice of 
prior proceedings in a case involving the same litigant” whether or not that case is identified by the 
parties). In a recent survey of chief judges of federal district courts, almost half of the responding judges 
reported that they use a “national three-strikes database” in prisoner cases. See ASSISTANCE TO PRO SE 
LITIGANTS, supra note 4, at 29. 
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including dismissal of the action.136 Courts also have revoked a plaintiff’s 
in forma pauperis status upon finding that the plaintiff misrepresented his 
or her prior litigation history.137 Although this is not technically a dismissal 
of the action, if the plaintiff is indigent and cannot afford the filing fee, it 
operates as such as a practical matter. The sanction of dismissal appears to 
be imposed most often when a court finds that the prisoner purposely 
omitted information from his or her litigation history.138 Of course, 
intentional omissions or violations of pleading requirements should not be 
condoned. At the same time, the penalties imposed demonstrate how a 
pleading requirement that was originally intended to aid the court in 
consolidating cases before a single judge has turned into a procedural basis 
for dismissing an action. 
Not every prisoner who fails to plead a full litigation history does so 
deliberately. Some prisoners err because they misunderstand what the form 
is asking. For example, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s 
dismissal of a prisoner’s complaint for failing to provide information of a 
prior lawsuit where the prisoner stated that he misunderstood the form to be 
asking only about prior lawsuits involving the same facts as the present 
suit—an instruction implied by many form complaints—and promptly 
provided information about the prior action once he learned that he had not 
complied with the form’s requirements.139 This susceptibility to 
misunderstanding instructions is heightened by the fact that most prisoners 
have lower-than-average education levels and reading abilities and higher-
than-average rates of intellectual disability and mental illness.140 In other 
 
 
 136. See, e.g., Hoskins, 663 F.3d at 543; Redmon, 414 F. App’x at 224–26; Greer v. Schriro, 255 F. 
App’x 285 (9th Cir. 2007); Hood v. Tompkins, 197 F. App’x 818 (11th Cir. 2006); Daily v. Municipality 
of Adams Cty., 117 F. App’x 669 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 137. See, e.g., Harris v. City of New York, 607 F.3d 18, 23 (2d Cir. 2010) (“As an initial matter, we 
note Harris's ‘Prisoner Complaint’ forms misrepresented how many strike suits he had filed prior to 
bringing the instant action. Harris should not benefit from his own misleading submissions . . . .”); Cruz 
v. Zwart, No. 9:13-CV-1287, 2014 WL 4771664, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2014) (“In my view, in the 
absence of any explanation for his conduct, and given his lengthy litigation history within the circuit, 
plaintiff's unabashed misstatement to this court concerning his prior litigation history in this and other 
actions was made in bad faith and warrants revocation of IFP status.”); Jackson v. Goord, No. 06-CV-
6172, 2014 WL 458018, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2014) (finding revocation of the plaintiff's IFP status 
and dismissal of the action warranted where the plaintiff “misrepresented his prior litigation history to 
the Court, hampering the Court's ability to evaluate his IFP application”); see also Waters v. Camacho, 
No. 11-CV-3263(JGK), 2012 WL 1117172, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2012) (revoking the plaintiff's IFP 
status, but expressly declining to dismiss the action, based on the plaintiff's misrepresentation to the 
court regarding his finances). 
 138. See Harris, 607 F.3d at 23; Cruz, 2014 WL 4771664, at *6; Jackson, 2014 WL 458018, at *3; 
Waters, 2012 WL 1117172, at *1. 
 139. Redmon, 414 F. App’x at 224–26.  
 140. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.  
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cases, courts have dismissed actions or affirmed district court dismissals 
without making an express finding that the plaintiff intentionally 
misrepresented his or her litigation history.141  
Prisoners may also make mistakes because they do not have 
documentation of their prior lawsuits or access to PACER. It is for this 
reason that courts have recognized prisoners should not bear the burden of 
pleading that they do not have three strikes. Defendants simply have better 
access to court records.142  
Additionally, there may be room for disagreement about whether an 
omission is innocent or intentional.143 A district court may, rightly or 
wrongly, not credit a prisoner’s explanation that the omission was innocent. 
But once that finding is made, a prisoner may have little recourse. The 
prisoner may not be able to afford the expense and time of an appeal, and 
the courts of appeals review a district court’s finding of intentional 
misconduct deferentially.144 In short, even if dismissal is an appropriate 
sanction for intentional misrepresentation, this pleading requirement creates 
a risk of uncorrectable error. 
Finally, requiring prisoners to plead litigation history while also 
requiring them to verify their complaint under the penalty of perjury 
imposes a double burden on prisoners. The federal rules do not require a 
verified complaint,145 yet most form complaints do. A prisoner who 
misstates his litigation history faces not only sanctions in his case but also 
can be subjected to perjury charges. Some courts also have pointed to the 
fact that a plaintiff’s misstatement about prior litigation history was made 
under penalty of perjury to justify dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint as a 
punishment.146  
 
 
 141. See, e.g., Hood, 197 F. App’x at 819; Daily, 117 F. App’x at 672. 
 142. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.  
 143. See, e.g., Still v. Crawford, 105 F. App’x 128, 130 (8th Cir. 2004) (disagreeing with the district 
court’s view that the prisoner’s failure to fill out the litigation history section of the form complaint was 
intentional where the prisoner simultaneously submitted an application to proceed IFP that listed eleven 
prior cases the prisoner had filed). 
 144. See, e.g., Hudson v. Fuller, 59 F. App’x 855, 857 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The factual finding that a 
misrepresentation occurred [regarding financial eligibility for IFP status] is reviewed for clear error, and 
the managerial decision to dismiss the suit as a sanction is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”); Hood, 
197 F. App’x at 819 (finding no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to dismiss the 
complaint for omitting prior litigation from the form complaint); cf. Still, 105 F. App’x at 129 (reviewing 
for abuse of discretion and reversing the district court’s decision that the prisoner’s failure to fill out the 
litigation history section of the form complaint was intentional where the prisoner simultaneously 
submitted an application to proceed IFP that listed eleven prior cases the prisoner had filed). 
 145. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.  
 146. See, e.g., Fanning v. Jones, No. 13-00541-KD-B, 2014 WL 31796, at *1 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 6, 
2014) (citation omitted) (“Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) provides that an action shall be dismissed if the 
action is found to be malicious. An action is deemed malicious under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) when a prisoner 
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No other class of litigants faces this requirement. Although there are 
reasons that a presiding judge would want to know the prisoner’s litigation 
history, there is a legitimate question whether district courts can create 
heightened pleading standards for one group of plaintiffs because it is 
administratively useful. Presumably, it is always administratively 
convenient to learn facts relating to affirmative defenses at the earliest 
possible stage. But the federal rules steadfastly do not require litigants to 
plead facts relating to statutes of limitations, qualified immunity, res 
judicata, and other affirmative defenses. Courts should question whether the 
forms they use alter these rules for one group of plaintiffs. 
B. Constraints on Pleading 
We also examined form complaints to see whether and how they enabled 
prisoners to adequately plead all of the relevant facts of their claim. We 
found that form complaints may discourage pro se prisoners from pleading 
sufficient facts in several ways. First, more than 70 percent of complaint 
forms instruct prisoners to state the facts of their claim “briefly” or “as 
briefly as possible,” or otherwise signal they should not provide detailed 
allegations. We also found that a number of forms limit or discourage 
plaintiffs from including additional pages of allegations if the form does not 
provide enough space. A smaller but still significant number prohibit, limit, 
or discourage plaintiffs from attaching documentation to support their 
allegations. Finally, 73 percent of complaints instruct prisoners not to make 
any legal argument or provide any legal citation, which could make it harder 
for a judge assessing a complaint to discern the relevance of the plaintiff’s 
factual allegations. 
These constraints were designed with the well-intentioned purpose of 
focusing prisoners’ overly verbose pro se complaints that included too much 
irrelevant information. At the time the limitations were imposed, courts 
could rely on the low bar of notice pleading and the special solicitude 
afforded pro se litigants to recognize and allow potentially meritorious 
actions to proceed past a motion to dismiss even if they pleaded only 
minimal facts. However, to the extent that courts now apply Twombly and 
Iqbal’s more restrictive pleading standard to pro se complaints,147 forms that 
 
 
plaintiff affirmatively misrepresents his prior litigation history on a complaint form requiring disclosure 
of such history and signs it under penalty of perjury. Such a misrepresentation ‘constitutes abuse of the 
judicial process warranting dismissal of the case without prejudice.’”). 
 147. There is some debate as to whether pro se complaints are governed by Twombly and Iqbal. See 
supra note 29.  
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require brevity run the risk of harming plaintiffs by encouraging them to 
leave out facts that might be necessary to move allegations over the line of 
plausibility.  
It is difficult to determine the optimal way for a standard form to guide 
a pro se litigant in pleading the factual and legal basis of his claim. A 
plaintiff whose factual recitation pleads too few facts risks dismissal for 
failing to establish plausibility. A plaintiff who is given no direction to plead 
concisely may fill the form with irrelevant information that causes the 
relevant facts to be lost. However, after Twombly and Iqbal, we believe that 
it is more important to err on the side of instructing prisoners to provide 
detailed relevant facts rather than on prioritizing brevity. Further, we believe 
that allowing a pro se plaintiff to cite a case she believes mirrors her own 
may help the court determine the relevance of otherwise ambiguous facts. 
1. Limiting Allegations to a Brief Statement of Facts 
Sixty-seven of the ninety-two form complaints—73 percent—direct pro 
se prisoners to state the facts of their claim “briefly.” Many instruct 
prisoners to state the facts “as briefly as possible.”148 It is understandable 
that the forms include this instruction. As might be expected from a group 
of judges convened to lessen the burden of pro se prisoner litigation on the 
federal courts, the committee that drafted the model form was concerned 
with containing lengthy allegations.149 Similarly, the sentiment among 
commentators, both at the time the committee was drafting its model 
complaint and today, is that prisoner pro se complaints contain mostly 
unhelpful or irrelevant allegations that make it difficult for a court to 
discover any legitimate claims that happen to be buried within.150 The form 
complaints are designed to address that problem, and many courts believe 
that form complaints have proven “extremely helpful . . . in clarifying 
pleadings often almost hopefully confused and unintelligible.’”151 One 
commentator suggests that courts should rigorously require that prisoners 
limit themselves to the space provided on the form complaint and that a 
 
 
 148. See, e.g., Form Complaint (M.D. Pa.), supra note 93, at 2; see also AO 2016 Form Complaint, 
supra note 76, at 5. 
 149. See supra notes 35-45 and accompanying text.  
 150. Id. 
 151. Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 246 (4th Cir. 1997) (Phillips, J., concurring and dissenting) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Serna v. O’Donnell, 70 F.R.D. 618, 620 (W.D. Mo. 1976)); see also 
ASSISTANCE TO PRO SE LITIGANTS, supra note 4, at 37–38 (finding that both district court clerks and 
chief judges identified “standardized forms” as among “the most effective measures for handling pro se 
cases”). 
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complaint should be rejected if it goes beyond the allotted space.152 
However, it is important to keep in mind that the committee was drafting 
its model form at a high point for liberal rules of notice pleading, 
particularly for pro se plaintiffs. At that time, a complaint’s sufficiency was 
governed by Conley v. Gibson,153 which established the rule that “a 
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it 
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support 
of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”154 Courts interpreted pro se 
complaints liberally and often were willing to give the plaintiff the benefit 
of the doubt regarding borderline allegations or to assume the existence of 
facts missing from the complaint consistent with the plaintiff’s theory of 
liability.155 Emblematic of this period is Gordon v. Leeke, in which the 
Fourth Circuit emphasized that district courts must look at any “set of facts 
which the plaintiff might be able to prove” in addition to the facts actually 
alleged in determining whether to grant or deny a motion to dismiss. The 
court held that the district court properly refused to dismiss the plaintiff’s 
case as originally drafted because “[i]t was theoretically possible that 
Gordon could prove thereunder a state of facts which would entitle him to 
recover, although it was certain that the precise basis for recovery was not 
alleged.”156 
But courts may no longer indulge plaintiffs who fail to include facts to 
support a necessary element of the plaintiffs’ cause of action. In Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court put Conley’s liberal pleading 
standard in “retirement.”157 The Court required pleading enough facts with 
enough specificity to push the plaintiff’s claim for relief from merely 
“conceivable” to “plausible.”158 Two years later, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the 
Court went further and held that all complaints must allege sufficiently 
specific facts to show a plausible claim for relief and that district courts are 
 
 
 152. Levy, supra note 20, at 513. Again, this imposes a restriction on prisoner plaintiffs not faced 
by any other group of litigants. 
 153. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 154. Id. at 45–46. 
 155. See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561–62 (2007) (describing how the 
lower court of appeals had found that a plaintiff stated a claim because of the possibility that the plaintiff 
may uncover direct evidence of conspiracy at a later stage, even if no evidence of direct conspiracy was 
pleaded in the complaint); see also Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal 
Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 558–68 (2010) (describing the “exceedingly low” threshold 
for sufficiency under Conley and identifying various ways in which courts interpreted complaints 
favorably to plaintiffs).  
 156. 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). 
 157. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563. 
 158. Id. at 570. 
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free to reject any allegation that is overly general or conclusory.159 
Although the Court did not hold that it was creating a heightened 
pleading standard or that it was requiring greater specificity in pleading, it 
effectively did so, as courts and commentators have recognized.160 It is 
commonly understood that plaintiffs must now provide “an extensive 
factual presentation” to demonstrate the plausibility of their claim.161 
Consequently, a complaint that omits facts necessary to the underlying 
claim may be more susceptible to dismissal than a complaint that is 
somewhat rambling.  
Some data exist to support this point. There has been a spate of recent 
research addressing dismissal rates pre- and post-Twombly and Iqbal. Most 
of the studies indicate that dismissal rates have climbed substantially, 
particularly for civil rights complaints, although a few reach different, or 
less stark, conclusions.162 The effect appears to be even more dramatic for 
 
 
 159. 556 U.S. 662, 677–79 (2009); see also Eclectic Props. E., LLC v. Marcus & Millichap Co., 
751 F.3d 990, 999 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming dismissal because plaintiffs failed “to do ‘something more’ 
to ‘render their allegations plausible within the meaning of Iqbal and Twombly’” (quoting In re Century 
Aluminum Co. Sec. Litig., 729 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2013)).  
 160. See, e.g., McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616–17 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations 
omitted) (explaining that “[w]e have interpreted Twombly and Iqbal to require the plaintiff to ‘provide 
some specific facts’ to support the legal claims asserted in the complaint” and that “the plaintiff must 
give enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds together” (quoting 
Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010)); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 
203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (recognizing that “pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice 
pleading to a more heightened form of pleading” as a result of Iqbal); 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1216 (3d ed. 2016) (“[I]t is likely that the plausibility pleading 
standard may have transformed the complaint's function from the limited role of providing notice of the 
claim to a more demanding standard through which plaintiffs must give notice through an extensive 
factual presentation of their complaints’ plausibility. Although relatively few in number, several cases 
already have indicated that courts have begun to demand greater factual presentation from plaintiffs in 
order to surpass the heightened hurdle of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, particularly in cases 
involving complex substantive issues.”); Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility 
Pleading, 101 VA. L. REV. 2117, 2118 (2015) (surveying existing scholarship and concluding that 
“[a]lmost all commentators agree that Iqbal and Twombly mark a break from the liberal pleading doctrine 
enunciated in 1957 by Conley v. Gibson”); A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive 
Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185, 196 (2010) (describing how certain complaints may now 
need “additional supporting facts to be believed” following Iqbal); Rory K. Schneider, Comment, 
Illiberal Construction of Pro Se Pleadings, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 585, 612 (2011) (asserting that Iqbal 
“drastically altered federal pleading practice”); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1221 (9th Cir. 
2011) (Trott, J., dissenting) (“The days of pleading conclusions without factual support accompanied by 
the wishful hope of finding something juicy during discovery are over.”).  
 161. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 160. 
 162. For a detailed discussion of the various empirical studies of dismissal rates before and after 
Twombly and Iqbal, see Reinert, supra note 160, at 2129–38. Some commentators have concluded that 
the dismissal rate has not changed in a statistically significant way, and others have suggested that all 
studies of dismissal rates are methodologically flawed and that few conclusions can be drawn from them. 
Id. In the wake of the controversy surrounding Iqbal, The Federal Judicial Center conducted its own 
study. While that study found a more limited effect on dismissal rates than some other studies, it 
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pro se prisoner complaints. While many of these studies either exclude pro 
se complaints entirely or do not control for them, two studies that controlled 
for pro se plaintiffs and pro se prisoner plaintiffs showed significant 
increases in dismissal rates, especially for pro se prisoner civil rights claims. 
One study that specifically examined pro se prisoner cases found that 
dismissal rates for factual insufficiency jumped 15 percent from 2006 to 
2010.163 Another study that examined pro se complaints generally similarly 
found that the rate courts dismissed pro se complaints for failure to state a 
claim increased from 67 percent under the Conley standard to 85 percent 
after Iqbal.164 This is a much higher rate increase than for complaints 
generally.165 Additionally, while the rate of dismissal for pro se complaints 
has always been higher than the rate of dismissal for counseled complaints, 
the disparity between the pro se dismissal rate and the counseled dismissal 
rate increased after Iqbal from 30 percent to 38 percent.166 Moreover, civil 
rights claims have had the most marked increase in dismissal rates of any 
type of claim.167 Thus, pro se prisoners filing civil rights claims are likely 
 
 
expressly excluded all pro se complaints. See JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO 
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 6 n.10 (2011). 
 163. Reinert, supra note 160, at 2147–51. It also found that pro se civil rights claims in general saw 
their dismissal rate increase from 85% to 92%. Id. Moreover, the study found that dismissal rates 
increased irrespective of whether the plaintiff had previously sought to amend the complaint to add more 
detailed factual allegations. Id. at 2148. 
 164. Hatamyar, supra note 155, at 615. Even though Professor Hatamyar’s study includes pro se 
complaints, it also is probably not a fully accurate benchmark for pro se prisoner complaints. In this 
study, Professor Hatamyar excluded all cases that were reviewed by a district court sua sponte (i.e. 
without the filing of a motion to dismiss by a defendant) as required by the PLRA as well as all 
complaints that were submitted with an application to proceed IFP. Id. at 585. Because most pro se 
prisoners are indigent and seek IFP status, a significant number of pro se prisoner complaints likely were 
excluded from the study. Although some of the increase in dismissals were dismissals with leave to 
amend, pro se parties in general may be less likely than represented parties to file an amended pleading. 
Pro se prisoners may encounter even greater difficulty in filing amended pleadings if they have limited 
ability to obtain paper, pens, postage, and photocopies.  
 165. Id. at 598–99, 615. Professor Hatamyar’s study shows that the rate that motions to dismiss 
were granted in some form (either granted without leave to amend, granted with leave to amend, or 
granted in part and denied in part) increased from 73% before Twombly and Iqbal to 82% after Iqbal. 
Id. at 598–99. 
 166. Schneider, supra note 160, at 618. 
 167. See, e.g., Patricia Hatamyar Moore, An Updated Study of Iqbal’s Impact on 12(B)(6) Motions, 
46 U. RICH. L. REV. 603, 605 (2012) (noting that the author’s study found that “constitutional civil rights 
cases in particular were dismissed at a higher rate post-Iqbal than pre-Twombly); Hatamyar, supra note 
155, at 556 (“Moreover, in the largest category of cases in which 12(b)(6) motions were filed—
constitutional civil rights cases—motions to dismiss were granted at a higher rate (53%) than in all other 
cases combined (49%), and the rate 12(b)(6) motions were granted in those cases increased from Conley 
(50%) to Twombly (55%) to Iqbal (60%).”); see also Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About 
Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1811, 1815 (2008) (conducting an initial study of dismissal rates after Twombly and 
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to be among the parties most affected by Iqbal and Twombly. 
Most form complaints do not reflect the new realities of pleading. 
Instead, they continue to instruct pro se prisoners to state the facts as briefly 
as possible. But what is generally assumed to constitute sufficient pleading 
based on the instructions of many form complaints may no longer be 
adequate to survive a motion to dismiss and may leave a court to deal with 
artificially and unhelpfully minimal pleadings.  
Given the change in the legal landscape, it is important to reassess the 
instructions contained in prisoner form complaints to make sure they do not 
hinder plaintiffs from submitting a well-pleaded complaint. In conducting 
that assessment, it is valuable to consider that some districts already provide 
instructions that are more consistent with post-Iqbal pleading realities. A 
number of districts’ form complaints do not instruct pro se prisoners to state 
their facts “as briefly as possible” but instead encourage them to give 
specific and detailed descriptions of their claims. For example, the District 
of New Hampshire’s form complaint directs plaintiffs to “[s]tate, with 
specificity, the facts and circumstances that gave rise to the violations or 
deprivations alleged.”168 Similarly, several complaints instruct plaintiffs to 
“[i]nclude all facts you consider important.”169 These forms encourage 
plaintiffs to be specific and to focus on what is important while also 
reducing the risk that the plaintiff will omit facts that are relevant or 
necessary to their claims. 
We think this approach is more appropriate for a post-Iqbal world. In 
our model complaint, we provide similar pleading instructions that we 
believe encourage plaintiffs to provide factual detail without encouraging 
them to overwhelm the court with pages of irrelevant information. We 
attempt to do this by instructing plaintiffs to focus on pleading specific facts 
– the who, what, where, and when – of what happened and to identify what 
each defendant did or failed to do.170 In doing so, we adapted language that 
several districts already use in their form complaints. We hope that these 
 
 
concluding that while the case generally had little impact on dismissal rates, “[t]he rate of dismissal in 
civil rights cases has spiked in the four months since Twombly” was decided); cf. Reinert, supra note 
160, at 2146–47 (finding that the dismissal rate for pro se civil rights complaints increased only 7 
percent, from 85 percent to 92 percent, but that the dismissal rate for counseled civil rights complaints 
increased 19 percent, from 47 percent to 66 percent).  
 168. Form Complaint (D.N.H.), at 5, http://www.nhd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/ 
ProSeGuide.pdf. 
 169. See, e.g., Form Complaint (C.D. Cal.), supra note 86, at 5; Form Complaint (S.D. Cal.), at 3, 
https://www.casd.uscourts.gov/Attorneys/Lists/Forms/Attachments/60/Complaint_Civil%20Rights%2
0Act%2042USC1983.pdf; Form Complaint (D. Mont.), at 6, http://www.mtd.uscourts.gov/ 
sites/mtd/files/Prisoner_Complaint.pdf; Form Complaint (D. Nev.), supra note 96, at 4.  
 170. See Appendix, infra. 
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instructions enable plaintiffs to tell their story, but to focus on facts that will 
be helpful for the court rather than on vague, rambling, and difficult-to-
decipher allegations. 
2. Limiting Space for Factual Allegations 
Form complaints may also limit pro se plaintiffs from including 
necessary facts by restricting the amount of space provided to plead their 
claims. Form complaints vary widely in the amount of space they allow for 
a prisoner’s factual allegations, from just a few lines to a full page or more. 
Ones that provide only a few lines to describe the entire factual basis of the 
claim may not give plaintiffs sufficient space. In the words of one district 
court: “It would be unfair to allow a Plaintiff to file a pro se Complaint on 
the standard form, which provides minimal room for elaboration on the 
factual issues, and then dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint under Rule 8 for 
failure to provide more factual allegations.”171 
While a complaint form necessarily cannot provide an unlimited amount 
of space, many forms protect the plaintiff’s ability to provide detailed facts 
by allowing allow plaintiffs to write on the back of the form or to attach 
additional pages. However, five complaints prohibit or discourage prisoners 
from attaching additional sheets.172 Eight complaints allow additional pages 
but place a limit on the number a plaintiff may include,173 and several others 
 
 
 171. Felder v. Del. Cty. Office of Servs. for the Aging, No. 08-4182, 2009 WL 2278514, at *3 (E.D. 
Pa. July 28, 2009). 
 172. For example, the Central District of Illinois form complaint instructions state, in all caps: “THE 
COURT URGES YOU TO USE ONLY THE SPACE PROVIDED” and that “[u]nrelated claims should 
be raised in a separate civil action.” Form Complaint (C.D. Ill.), at 5, 
http://www.ilcd.uscourts.gov/sites/ilcd/files/forms/1983%20COMPLAINT_TNR.pdf. The Middle 
District of Georgia warns plaintiffs that their complaints must be “simple, concise, and direct,” and 
instructs plaintiffs that the court will inform them if additional information is needed. See also Form 
Complaint (S.D. Iowa), supra note 88 (“If you need more space to answer a question, use the back side 
of this form or an extra blank page. However, if you keep your answer to the point, extra space should 
not be needed.”); Form Complaint (E.D. Tex.), supra note 84, at 4 (“Attach extra pages if necessary, but 
remember that your complaint must be stated briefly and concisely. IF YOU VIOLATE THIS RULE, 
THE COURT MAY STRIKE YOUR COMPLAINT.”). 
 173. The District of Kansas and the Northern District of Oklahoma, for example, permit pro se 
plaintiffs to attach “up to two additional pages (8 1/2” x 11”) to explain any allegation or to list additional 
supporting facts.” Form Complaint (D. Kan.), supra note 93, at 3; Form Complaint (N.D. Okla.), supra 
note 93, at 2; Form Complaint (E.D. Okla.). The Middle District of Alabama similarly limits prisoners 
to two additional pages. Form Complaint (M.D. Ala.), supra note 93. The Middle District of 
Pennsylvania restrict plaintiffs to three additional sheets. Form Complaint (M.D. Pa.), supra note 93, at 
2. The Northern District of Florida prohibits prisoners from submitting more than five additional sheets 
absent “extraordinary circumstances.” Form Complaint (N.D. Fla.), at 5, 
http://www.flnd.uscourts.gov/file/97/download?token=006Em5XH. The Southern District of Alabama 
similarly limits plaintiffs to five additional sheets. Form Complaint (S.D. Ala.). The Western District of 
Louisiana, by local rule, limits prisoner plaintiffs to five additional typewritten sheets or ten additional 
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do not specify one way or the other whether additional sheets are allowed. 
Of those that allow additional pages, four are ambiguous as to whether 
additional sheets may only be used for describing new claims or new 
defendants rather than for providing additional facts about a particular 
claim, and seven others are written ambiguously to suggest that a plaintiff 
can attach only one additional sheet.174 Thus, some complaints that do not 
prohibit additional sheets may give pro se prisoners the impression that they 
do. There is, of course, no restriction on the length of complaints filed by 
plaintiffs not using the pro se prisoner form. 
While prohibiting, discouraging, or limiting additional sheets may have 
been a sensible piece of advice in the Conley era, such restrictions may no 
longer serve their intended purpose in the new pleading era of Twombly and 
Iqbal. A requirement to be brief, while generally good advice, could now 
prove harmful to pro se prisoners and courts. 
3. Form Complaints that Prohibit or Restrict Plaintiffs from 
Attaching Documentary Evidence 
A small but significant number of form complaints prohibit prisoners 
from attaching documents to their complaints or limit the number of pages 
 
 
hand-written sheets. W. DIST. LA. LOCAL R. 3.2. (2016). The District of Arizona limits prisoners to 
fifteen additional sheets. Form Complaint (D. Ariz.), supra note 88, at 1. The Western District of Texas 
form states that the entire complaint, including attachments and additional sheets, cannot exceed 20 
pages. Form Complaint (W.D. Tex.). The Southern District of Iowa, the District of Nebraska, the District 
of Rhode Island, the District of Maine, the District of Vermont, and the District of New Jersey imply 
that only one extra sheet may be included by instructing, “[a]ttach an extra sheet, if necessary.” Form 
Complaint (S.D. Iowa), supra note 88, at 4; Form Complaint (D. Neb.), supra note 94; Form Complaint 
(D.R.I.), supra note 94; Form Complaint (D. Me.), supra note 94; Form Complaint (D. Vt.), supra note 
104; Form Complaint (D.N.J.), supra note 94, at 5. Similarly, the Southern District of Florida form 
implies that only one extra sheet is permitted, stating: “If you need more space than is provided on the 
form, attach an additional blank page to the complaint.” (S.D. Fla.), http://www.flsd.uscourts.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05 /Complaint-Under-the-Civil-Rights-Act-42-USC-19832.pdf. 
 174. For example, the Central District of California’s form complaint, in the section where it directs 
the plaintiff to identify his or her claim, states: “If there is more than one claim, describe the additional 
claim(s) on another attached piece of paper . . . ,” implying that additional sheets are only for additional 
claims. Form Complaint (C.D. Cal.), supra note 86, at 5. However, on the first page of the instructions 
for the form complaint, the instructions state: “If you need additional space to answer a question, you 
must use the reverse side of the form or an additional blank page.” Id. at 1. The District of Montana’s 
form complaint contains a similar discrepancy between what is stated on the complaint itself and what 
is stated in the instructions page. Form Complaint (D. Mont.), supra note 169, at 2, 6. The Western 
District of New York form states: “If you have additional claims, use the above format and set them out 
on additional sheets of paper,” suggesting that additional paper is only allowed for submitting additional 
claims. Form Complaint (W.D.N.Y.), supra note 86, at 6. The District of Nevada provides two lines at 
the end of the complaint designated as “Additional space, if needed” for the entire complaint. It is not 
clear whether the plaintiff is permitted to go beyond the two lines provided. Form Complaint (D. Nev.), 
supra note 96, at 9. 
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of documents that can be attached. Five complaints prohibit attached 
documents altogether, two more permit exhibits but discourage prisoners 
from using them, and two complaints place a page limit on the number of 
documents that can be included.175 Prohibiting prisoners from including 
attachments treats prisoners differently from other litigants and is 
inconsistent with governing law. It is a general rule of pleading that a court 
evaluating the sufficiency of the complaint can consider not just the 
complaint itself but also documents attached to the complaint or 
incorporated by reference.176 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(c) 
establishes that “[a] copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a 
pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”177 This Rule applies with 
equal force to all complaints, but is contradicted by these forms. 
Moreover, prohibiting attachments may run counter to the goal of 
producing complaints that are easier to understand. If complaints are poorly 
written because the pro se plaintiff is not trained in the law, is not aware of 
which facts are important, and cannot communicate effectively in writing, 
then attaching documents can be a benefit rather than a detriment. Outside 
documents can supply essential facts that provide courts with the clarity and 
concreteness that is missing from the plaintiff’s allegations. There are 
numerous examples, both in the prisoner context and outside it, where a 
poorly drafted complaint was rescued from dismissal because the plaintiff 
attached documents that provided essential facts or context.178 Thus, 
prohibiting prisoners from attaching documents may cause potentially 
 
 
 175. See supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text. 
 176. See, e.g., Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012); 
Samuels v. Air Transp. Local 504, 992 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1993); 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., 
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.34[2] (3d ed. 2016) (“In deciding whether to dismiss, the court may 
consider only the facts alleged in the pleadings, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by 
reference in the pleadings, and matters of which the judge may take judicial notice.”). 
 177. FED. R. CIV. P. 10(c). 
 178. See, e.g., Streater v. Hemet Valley Hospital, 956 F.2d 1168 at *1 (9th Cir. 1992) (unpublished 
table decision) (reversing dismissal for failure to plead the basis for federal jurisdiction where “[o]ne of 
the attachments [to the complaint], a letter from the EEOC, states that Streater’s claims before the EEOC 
were ‘filed under Title VII and EPA [the Equal pay provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act]’”); 
Judkins v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 745 F.2d 1330, 1332 (11th Cir. 1984) (finding that plaintiff’s filing of 
his charge of discrimination that he filed with the EEOC provided sufficient factual information to state 
a claim for discrimination); Hernandez v. Cate, 918 F. Supp. 2d 987 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (relying on form 
complaint plus attached documents in holding that the inmate stated a claim); Barnes v. Ross, 926 F. 
Supp. 2d 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (looking at the plaintiff’s complaint and attached documents in finding 
that the plaintiff stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause); Vogelfang v. Capra, 889 F. Supp. 2d 
489 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (relying on complaint and attached documents in determining that some of the 
prisoner’s claims survived a motion to dismiss); see also Page v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 222 F.3d 453, 
454–55 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding the EEOC charge that pro se plaintiff attached to her letter to the court 
was the “substantial equivalent of a complaint” and provided sufficient factual detail regarding the 
plaintiff’s discrimination claim to survive a motion to dismiss). 
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meritorious claims to be misunderstood or dismissed. 
To be sure, just as allowing plaintiffs unlimited space for factual 
allegations without any cautionary instructions creates the risk that pro se 
prisoners will provide too much information, allowing pro se prisoners to 
provide unlimited pages of exhibits without cautionary instructions creates 
the risk that prisoners will attach reams of paper, causing the most relevant 
exhibits to get buried in the morass. However, we think that, on balance, it 
is better to encourage exhibits than discourage them. At best, exhibits may 
clarify or enhance an otherwise deficient complaint. At worst, exhibits may 
be ignored, but will not affirmatively damage the prisoner’s claim. 
4. Prohibiting Legal Argument or Citation to Legal Authority 
Sixty-seven of the ninety-two complaint forms, or 73 percent, follow the 
model complaint form and instruct prisoners not to make legal argument or 
cite legal authority. This may reflect a concern that pro se prisoners will fill 
up their complaint with conclusory legal statements and will fail to provide 
the facts necessary for a court to assess the sufficiency of the complaint. 
However, by instructing prisoners not to include any legal argument or 
citation in their complaints, courts may unwittingly prevent prisoners from 
providing helpful insight as to the nature of their claims and how the 
included facts should be construed.  
For example, a prisoner may allege that a guard destroyed his television 
set after he reported that he witnessed the guard assaulting another inmate. 
On the face of these allegations alone, the court might assume that the 
prisoner is making a due process claim for destruction of personal property 
or an Eighth Amendment claim on behalf of the assaulted inmate. Both are 
easily dismissed on the pleadings. However, if the plaintiff argues or cites a 
case to demonstrate that he believes these facts to state a claim of First 
Amendment retaliation, the nature of the allegations changes. The court may 
then conclude that reporting the assault and the destruction of the television 
set are related and that the plaintiff has pleaded a viable retaliation claim. 
Several districts have modified their forms in ways that may help address 
this concern. For example, some forms provide a section instructing 
prisoners to describe their legal claim and to identify what rights they are 
asserting and a separate section instructing the prisoner to include factual 
allegations supporting that claim.179 Such instructions enable plaintiffs to 
 
 
 179. See, e.g., Form Complaint (E.D. Ky.), supra note 86; Form Complaint (E.D. Mich.), supra note 
84, at 4–7; Form Complaint (D. Neb.), supra note 94; Form Complaint (S.D. Cal.), supra note 169, at 
3; Form Complaint (D. Idaho), supra note 90, at 2; Form Complaint (D. Mont.), supra note 169, at 6; 
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articulate a legal argument or legal theory without running the risk that they 
will simply make legal arguments and fail to plead facts. Additionally, 
having separate sections for legal claims and factual allegations allows 
courts to continue to instruct plaintiffs not to substitute legal argument or 
case citation for a statement of their relevant facts. Our model complaint 
follows this approach by creating separate sections for plaintiffs to plead 
facts and to identify their legal claims.  
C. Pleading Legal Conclusions 
The final aspect of form complaints that we examined is whether the 
forms require plaintiffs to understand legal terminology or to plead legal 
conclusions. Sixteen form complaints direct prisoners to indicate whether 
and how the defendants were acting “under color of law,” as required to 
state a claim under § 1983.180 Fourteen form complaints direct the prisoner 
to indicate whether the defendants are being sued in their individual 
capacity or their official capacity.181 Such questions carry potential risk for 
unsophisticated pro se plaintiffs while providing little, if any, benefit. Pro 
se prisoners may not understand the legal meaning of these or other legal 
terms, even if the form provides a definition, as some do.182 Prisoners who 
do not understand what is being asked may leave that section of the form 
blank or may answer incorrectly, which can result in unintended 
concessions. 
For example, § 1983 establishes that a plaintiff can raise a civil rights 
 
 
Form Complaint (D. Nev.), supra note 96, at 6; Form Complaint (D. Colo.), at 3–4, 
http://www.cod.uscourts.gov/Portals/ 0/Documents/Forms/CivilForms/Prisoner_Complaint_Form.pdf; 
Form Complaint (D. Kan.), supra note 93, at 3; Form Complaint (D.N.M.) , supra note 86, at 2–3; Form 
Complaint (M.D. Ala.), supra note 93; Form Complaint (M.D. Fla.), at 5, 
http://www.flmd.uscourts.gov/forms/Prisoner/ PrisonerCivilRightsComplaint.pdf; Form Complaint 
(N.D. Fla.), supra note 173, at 6–7; Form Complaint (D. Or.), supra note 100, at 3, 5. 
 180. See, e.g., Form Complaint (D. Kan.), supra note 93, at 2; Form Complaint (D. Haw.), at 2, 
http://www.hid.uscourts.gov/forms/1983_COMPLAINT_FORM_(Rev_Jan._2008).pdf; Form 
Complaint (N.D. W. Va.), at 9, http://www.wvnd.uscourts.gov/sites/wvnd/files/sites/wvnd/files/ 
1983%20Packet%20State%20Civil%20Rights%20Complaint%2012-05-2013.pdf. 
 181. See, e.g.,; Form Complaint (W.D.N.Y.), supra note 86, at 2; Form Complaint (E.D.N.C.), supra 
note 84, at 3; Form Complaint (W.D. Mich.), at 2, http://www.miwd.uscourts.gov/sites/ 
miwd/files/cmpref.pdf; Form Complaint (E.D. Ark.), supra note 85, at 5; Form Complaint (S.D. Cal.), 
supra note 169, at 2. The District of Puerto Rico asks this question on its complaint form for Bivens 
claims, but not for § 1983 claims. Bivens Form Complaint (D.P.R.), http://www.prd.uscourts.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/17/form_Bivens_28_USC_1331_REV_06_2006.pdf. 
 182. For example, the District of Hawaii’s form complaint provides a definition and explanation of 
state action and also describes the difference between individual capacity and official capacity lawsuits. 
Form Complaint (D. Haw.), supra note 180, at 2. The District of Idaho and the Western District of 
Kentucky similarly attempt to provide a distinction between individual and official capacity suits. Form 
Complaint (D. Idaho), supra note 90, at 2; Form Complaint (W.D. Ky.), supra note 85, at 2. 
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claim against someone acting “under color” of law.183 In general, this means 
that there must be “state action” on the part of the defendant.184 Whether a 
defendant is a state actor can be difficult to determine, and the state action 
doctrine has been criticized as hopelessly complex.185 Thus, a pro se 
prisoner with no legal training may not know whether a particular defendant 
is a state actor, or may assume that a defendant is not a state actor when the 
doctrine actually would direct such a finding. A prisoner who answers “no” 
when asked if the defendants acted under color of law may be deemed to 
have conceded that those defendants are not state actors and the defendants 
may be dismissed from the case, even if the law would support treating them 
as state actors.186 On the flip side, no benefit accrues to the prisoner or the 
court from a conclusory statement that the defendants were acting “under 
color” of law. Whether there is state action is a legal question. District courts 
are not required to accept legal conclusions in a complaint as true, but must 
make their own independent determination based on the facts alleged. Thus, 
even if a prisoner alleges there was state action, that does not end the court’s 
inquiry. 
The same concerns arise when plaintiffs are asked to indicate whether 
they are suing the defendants in their individual capacity or their official 
capacity. Especially given that defendants must be state actors to be sued 
under § 1983, and because many § 1983 lawsuits arise out of conduct that 
defendants commit while on the job, pro se plaintiffs might reasonably think 
that they are suing defendants in their official capacities. But the terms’ legal 
meanings are more complex. The distinction between official capacity and 
individual capacity arises out of the fact that courts treat a suit against a 
state-level defendant in his or her official capacity as a suit against the State 
itself.187 Because states have sovereign immunity from damages under the 
Eleventh Amendment, a plaintiff who checks “official capacity” on the form 
 
 
 183. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 184. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966) (“In cases under § 1983, ‘under color’ of 
law has consistently been treated as the same thing as the ‘state action’ required under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”). 
 185. See, e.g., Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 338 (3d Cir. 2005) (describing state action 
jurisprudence as “labyrinthine”); Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term — Foreword: 
“State Action,” Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 69, 95 (1967) 
(describing the state action doctrine as a “conceptual disaster area”); see also Edmonson v. Leesville 
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Unfortunately, our cases deciding 
when private action might be deemed that of the state have not been a model of consistency.”). 
 186. See, e.g., Bunch v. Craig, 304 F. App’x 669, 670 (10th Cir. 2008) (affirming dismissal of pro 
se prisoner’s § 1983 claim for failure to state a claim and noting that “Mr. Bunch checked boxes on the 
complaint form saying that neither defendant was acting ‘under color of state law.’”). 
 187. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (“[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all respects 
other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.”). 
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complaint will lose any opportunity to pursue damages claims against state 
officials, although that plaintiff may still obtain injunctive relief.188 To 
obtain damages against a state defendant, that defendant must be sued in an 
individual capacity, because that means that the plaintiff is seeking to hold 
the defendant personally liable in damages.189 Relatedly, a plaintiff who 
sues a municipal employee in an official capacity can recover damages, but 
only if the plaintiff meets the stringent standard of showing that a municipal 
“policy or custom” caused the violation.190  
But it is far from clear that a pro se prisoner will understand these 
distinctions. Thus, asking plaintiffs to elect options stated in legal 
terminology provides little benefit to the court and may cause plaintiffs to 
make mistakes and lose out on the possibility of pursuing claims for 
damages.191 The better practice is what the law already requires: for the 
court to rely on the plaintiff’s factual allegations instead of his legal 
conclusions to determine whether defendants acted under color of state law 
and rely on the types of relief the plaintiff requests to determine in what 
capacity the defendants are sued.192 
Finally, a handful of form complaints appear to make statements of law 
or otherwise provide information to prisoners that is not legally correct. For 
example, the Northern District of Mississippi form complaint warns 
prisoners of the consequences of the PLRA’s three-strikes rule, stating that 
 
 
 188. See id. at 165–67, 167 n.14. 
 189. Id. at 166. 
 190. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). 
 191. See, e.g., Trapp v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 139 F. App’x 12, 15 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting that the 
plaintiff, on his form complaint, “checked the box indicating he was suing each of the defendants in their 
official capacities,” but recognizing that he also intended to raise claims against the individual 
defendants in their individual capacities). Additionally, asking prisoners to plead whether each defendant 
is being sued in an individual capacity or an official capacity may be inconsistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 
9(a), which states that a pleading need not allege “a party’s capacity to sue or be sued,” except when 
necessary to establish the court’s jurisdiction. 
 192. If the defendant’s capacity is not designated, then the court must read the complaint as a whole 
to determine each defendant’s status. To be sure, there may be some small risk that a court will treat the 
suit as an official capacity suit even if the plaintiff seeks damages from individual defendants. See, e.g., 
Colvin v. McDougall, 62 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 1995) (reversing award of punitive damages against 
defendant where the complaint did not specify the defendant’s capacity and the court interpreted the 
complaint as an official capacity suit); Lovelace v. O’Hara, 985 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1993) (treating suit 
that did not expressly state whether defendant was sued in individual or official capacity as an official 
capacity suit only and reversing district court that allowed the plaintiff to amend the complaint to name 
the defendant in his individual capacity). More likely, however, is that courts can assess the defendant’s 
capacity based on whether or not the plaintiff requests damages.  
 Additionally, prisoners might not always be aware of the types of relief that they can request or that 
are available to them. A form complaint can aid prisoners in this respect by providing a short description 
of different kinds of remedies. Our model complaint form contains a “Relief” section that informs 
prisoners to inform the court if they are seeking money damages, if they are asking the defendants to do 
something or to stop doing something, or if they want both kinds of relief. See Appendix, infra. 
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a prisoner who collects three-strikes “will be barred from bringing any 
further civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding 
unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.”193 
That statement is over-inclusive. The PLRA only bars prisoners with three-
strikes from filing future IFP actions, but it places no restrictions on a 
prisoner’s ability to file civil actions if the prisoner is not IFP.194 The District 
of Montana form complaint states that “[p]risoners may not maintain more 
than two civil actions in forma pauperis at one time, unless the prisoner 
shows that he or she is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.”195 
Although the District of Montana has a local rule to that effect, nothing in 
the PLRA or in the federal in forma pauperis statute196 limits prisoners to 
two concurrent IFP actions. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND MODEL FORM COMPLAINT 
The form complaints used by federal district courts are designed with 
good intentions and with the important goal of helping pro se prisoners 
plead their claims so that courts may more easily identify potential merit.197 
Federal judges have emphasized that standardized forms, including form 
complaints, are among “the most effective measures for handling pro se 
cases.”198 At the same time, as our empirical review of form complaints has 
shown, there are several ways in which form complaints are inconsistent 
with governing law and may thwart their intended goals. Reassessment is 
needed. 
To address these concerns, we have developed a revised model 
complaint form, included as an appendix, which encompasses our 
recommendations.199 Much of the language of our revised model complaint, 
and in particular the instructions about pleading, comes directly from form 
complaints currently in use, and our model form is annotated to show the 
 
 
 193. Form Complaint (N.D. Miss.), supra note 84 (emphasis added). 
 194. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2012) (prohibiting prisoners with three strikes from bringing future civil 
actions under the federal in forma pauperis statute). 
 195. Form Complaint (D. Mont.), supra note 169, at 3. 
 196. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2012). 
 197. See, e.g., Durham v. Lappin, 346 F. App’x 330, 333 (10th Cir. 2009) (stating that prisoner form 
complaints and the local rules requiring their use are designed “for the prisoner’s own benefit,” and that 
they “advance[] the legitimate goal of providing guidance to pro se prisoners as to the legal requirements 
of a complaint”). 
 198. ASSISTANCE TO PRO SE LITIGANTS, supra note 4, at 37–38; Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 
246 (4th Cir. 1997) (Phillips, J., concurring and dissenting) (stating that form complaints “have ‘proved 
extremely helpful . . . in clarifying pleadings often almost hopelessly confused and unintelligible.’” 
(quoting Serna v. O’Donnell, 70 F.R.D. 618, 620 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (alteration in original))). 
 199. See Appendix, infra. 
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proposed language’s source and explain why it is included. We hope that 
the model form best serves the federal judiciary’s original twin aims of 
helping the courts manage pro se prisoner litigation while also ensuring that 
potentially meritorious claims are not improperly dismissed or overlooked. 
We try to strike that balance in the following ways. 
First, the model form does not include a requirement to plead facts 
related to administrative exhaustion. After Jones, such facts are definitively 
part of an affirmative defense and must be the defendant’s burden. Although 
a substantial majority of form complaints require plaintiffs to plead facts 
about exhaustion, nearly 20 percent do not. Thus, it is possible to have a 
functional and effective form complaint that does not ask about 
exhaustion.200 To that end, the Fifth Circuit has held that “a district court 
cannot by local rule sidestep Jones by requiring prisoners to affirmatively 
plead exhaustion” in their form complaints.201 Courts in that circuit have 
refused to rely on statements regarding exhaustion that a plaintiff makes 
pursuant to the requirements of the form complaint.202 
Second, the revised model form does not require a prisoner plaintiff to 
plead his litigation history in circumstances where a non-prisoner plaintiff 
would not be required to do so. Courts may obtain information to help them 
administer and process their cases by other means.203 Courts can obtain this 
information quickly through PACER, or through use of the three strikes 
database.204  
 
 
 200. A good example is the form complaint used by the U.S. District Court for the Western District 
of Kentucky, which instructs prisoners that exhaustion is required before filing suit, but says that 
prisoners to do not have to provide information about exhaustion in the complaint. Form Complaint 
(W.D. Ky.), supra note 85.  
 201. Carbe v. Lappin, 492 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 202. See, e.g., Perkins v. Collins, 482 F. App’x 959, 960 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (“Here, the 
court relied on Perkins’s response to Question III on a form complaint, which asked whether he had 
exhausted his administrative remedies. . . . Reliance on information elicited by such a form complaint 
effectively put the onus on Perkins to affirmatively plead and demonstrate exhaustion . . . .”); McDonald 
v. Cain, 426 F. App’x 332, 333 (5th Cir. 2011) (“The prohibition against requiring prisoners to 
affirmatively plead exhaustion has been further interpreted by this court to encompass questions in ‘form 
complaint[s]’ issued by district courts that are designed to elicit ‘information about [a prisoner’s] 
exhaustion of administrative remedies.” (quoting Torns v. Miss. Dep’t of Corrs., 301 F. App’x 386, 389 
(5th Cir. 2008) (alterations in original))). 
 203. See, e.g., Carbe, 492 F.3d at 327–28 (describing the use of “Spears hearings” in courts within 
the Fifth Circuit as a way of collecting information relevant for determining whether a complaint should 
be dismissed before the defendants are served). 
 204. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. For example, the court could request litigation 
history information on the form but not treat it as part of the pleading—i.e. not rely on that information 
at the motion to dismiss stage. Courts may request such information in a civil docketing statement or 
case information sheet that might accompany the complaint. Such forms are not considered part of a 
pleading and are not relied on for evaluating the complaint’s sufficiency. See, e.g., Favors v. Coughlin, 
877 F.2d 219, 220 (2d Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (“The civil cover sheet, of course, is merely an 
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With respect to whether a form complaint places burdens on a prisoner’s 
ability to plead sufficient facts to state a claim, we recommend several 
changes. First, we recommend that the form continue to direct the plaintiff 
toward pleading only relevant and specific facts, but not include language 
encouraging plaintiffs to state their facts “briefly.” We have adopted a mix 
of language that several districts currently use that captures the need to 
provide detail while focusing the plaintiff on facts, as follows: 
 State only the facts of your claim below. Include all the facts you 
consider important.205 Be as specific as possible.206 Make sure to 
describe exactly what each defendant did or failed to do that caused 
the alleged wrong207 and include any other facts that show why you 
believe what happened was wrong. You should include the names of 
all persons involved, when the events took place, where the events 
took place, what each person did or did not do, and a description of 
how you believe you were injured or how your rights were 
violated.208  
 If you need additional space, you may attach extra sheets. If you 
 
 
administrative aid to the court clerk, and is therefore not typically considered part of a litigant’s pleading 
papers.”); S. DIST. FLA. LOCAL RULE 3.3 (2014) (stating that cover sheet is “solely for administrative 
purposes” and that “matters appearing only in the civil cover sheet have no legal effect in the action”); 
see also Wall v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 718 F.2d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting that the civil 
docketing statement is just an administrative aid for the court in managing the case, and often is not 
served on the opposing party). But this approach also has drawbacks. It would add another form for the 
pro se prisoner to fill out, which may increase the opportunity for error or may cause some prisoners to 
decide not to file a lawsuit at all because of the added burden. And there always is the risk that courts 
will rely on the information in a cover sheet, even if it is not technically part of the pleading. 
 205. Several form complaints currently in use utilize similar language. See, e.g., Form Complaint 
(D. Colo.), supra note 179, at 4; Form Complaint (D. Kan.), supra note 93, at 3; Form Complaint (D. 
Mont.), supra note 169, at 6; Form Complaint (D. Nev.), supra note 96, at 6; Form Complaint (D.N.M.), 
supra note 86, at 3; Form Complaint (E.D. Okla.), at 2, http://www.oked.uscourts.gov/sites/ 
oked/files/forms/Pro%20Se%20Complaint.pdf; Form Complaint (N.D. Okla.), supra note 93, at 2; Form 
Complaint (S.D. Cal.), supra note 169, at 3; Form Complaint (C.D. Cal.), supra note 86, at 5. 
 206. A number of form complaints direct plaintiffs to be specific. See, e.g., Form Complaint (D. 
Ariz.), supra note 88, at 4 (“Be as specific as possible.”); Form Complaint (D. Conn.), at 5, 
http://www.ctd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/forms/Prisoner%20Civil%20Rights%20Complaint%20
Rev%203-16-16.pdf (“[B]e specific about dates, times, and the names of the people involved.”). 
 207. See, e.g., Form Complaint (S.D. Ind.), at 2, http://www.insd.uscourts.gov/sites/insd/files/ 
forms/Prisoner%20Complaint%20Form.pdf; Form Complaint (E.D. Mo.), at 5, 
http://www.moed.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/moed-0036.pdf; Form Complaint (D. Neb.); Form 
Complaint (S.D. Iowa), supra note 88, at 4; Form Complaint (D. Ariz.), supra note 88, at 3; Form 
Complaint (S.D. Cal.), supra note 169, at 3; Form Complaint (D. Haw.), supra note 180, at 5; Form 
Complaint (D. Nev.), supra note 96, at 6; Form Complaint (D. Utah), http://www.utd.uscourts.gov/ 
forms/civilrt_guide.pdf; Form Complaint (E.D. Tex.), supra note 84, at 4.  
 208. Several districts direct plaintiffs to describe the facts in this “who, what, where, when, how” 
format. See, e.g., Form Complaint (W.D. Tex.), supra note 93, at 4; Form Complaint (E.D. Ky.); Form 
Complaint (D. Kan.), supra note 93, at 3. 
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wish to include any documents that support the facts of your claim, 
you may attach them to this completed form.209 Please refer to 
specific documents whenever you rely on those documents to support 
your factual allegations. 
 Any claims that are not related to these events or to the injury you 
suffered should be raised in a separate civil action. 
Second, like many form complaints currently in use, the proposed model 
form informs plaintiffs that they may attach additional sheets if they find 
they do not have sufficient space to describe their factual allegations. We 
recommend that all districts explicitly inform plaintiffs that they may use 
additional sheets if they need more space and clarify that (a) more than a 
single sheet may be provided, and (b) the additional sheets may be used for 
providing expanded information about a single claim rather than just for 
adding new claims or defendants.210  
Third, we recommend that form complaints should neither prohibit nor 
discourage prisoners from attaching documents to their complaint, 
especially because such a restriction appears to be inconsistent with the law 
regarding pleading.211 In many cases, attaching documents may promote 
clarity and may amplify the factual details of the plaintiff’s claim, thus 
promoting the primary goals of the form complaint. The model form 
informs plaintiffs that they may attach documentation to support their 
claims. To mitigate against the risk that prisoners will submit mountains of 
paper for judges to sift through, the complaint instructs prisoners to provide 
citations or references to specific exhibits when they relate to the facts they 
allege in the complaint. 
Fourth, the model form contains separate sections for plaintiffs to plead 
their factual allegations and to state the legal grounds for their claim. This 
gives plaintiffs an opportunity to cite cases or other legal authority that 
might help the court discern the relevance of the factual allegations without 
cluttering up the fact section with legal conclusions. As stated earlier, a 
number of forms already utilize these separate sections.212 
Fifth, the proposed model form, unlike most current form complaints, 
 
 
 209. See, e.g., Form Complaint (S.D. Ill.), supra note 86, at 5 (instructing plaintiffs that when 
describing the facts of the claim, “[y]ou should also attach any relevant, supporting documentation.”); 
see also JUSTICE & DIVERSITY CTR., BAR OF S.F., INSTRUCTIONS: WRITING AND FILING A COMPLAINT 
www.cand.uscourts.gov/filelibrary/491/Complaint%20packet.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2016) (“You 
may attach documents that support your claims to the end of this Complaint as exhibits.”). 
 210. See infra Appendix. 
 211. See supra notes 176–177 and accompanying text.  
 212. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.  
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does not require the prisoner to verify the complaint under the penalty of 
perjury. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require other plaintiffs 
to file verified complaints, except in special circumstances, and requiring 
prisoners to verify therefore places an extra burden on them that is not faced 
by most other litigants.213 Mandating a verified complaint increases the risk 
that a pro se plaintiff will be sanctioned or face perjury charges if the 
complaint contains an error or a misstatement. Nor is verification necessary. 
The committee that drafted the original form complaint included the 
verification requirement as “a reasonable substitute for the sanction 
imposed on attorneys by Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”214 This 
is unnecessary, as Rule 11 has always applied to unrepresented parties, 
dating back to the Rule’s adoption in 1937.215 The fact that pro se parties 
are subject to Rule 11 sanctions eliminates the need to also require them to 
verify their complaint. Our model form includes the Rule 11 standard 
instead of a requirement for verification.  
Our model form does not ask plaintiffs to identify whether they are suing 
the defendants in their individual or official capacities or to explain how the 
defendants acted under color of state law. Courts may assess these questions 
more accurately and easily by looking to the nature of the plaintiffs’ 
allegations and their claims for relief rather than to their answers to these 
questions. Courts should consider whether the questions that their form 
complaints ask provide real value or instead create opportunities for mistake 
and confusion by unsophisticated pro se litigants.  
Because the law is fluid and will continue to change, we believe that 
district courts should designate a staff person to periodically review their 
forms for compliance with governing law and to evaluate their 
effectiveness. To the extent that form complaints raise concerns, those 
concerns most likely are inadvertent and reflect how forms simply have not 
always kept up with changes in the law. Requiring regular review of form 
complaints will help ensure that, as the law evolves, form complaints evolve 
in corresponding fashion. 
 
 
 213. See supra note 145.  
 214. 1976 Report, supra note 16, at 30. 
 215. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) (1937), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/committee-
reports/advisory-committee-rules-civil-procedure-april-1937 (“A party who is not represented by an 
attorney shall sign the pleading and shall be subject to the obligations and penalties herein prescribed 
for attorneys.”). The current version of the rule also applies to “an attorney or unrepresented party.” FED. 
R. CIV. P. 11(b). 
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CONCLUSION 
Pro se prisoners face significant hurdles in seeking to vindicate civil 
rights violations they suffer while in prison, and federal judges face 
significant burdens in managing the large volume of pro se prisoner cases 
on their dockets. Standardized form complaints carry the potential to greatly 
assist both pro se plaintiffs and the courts in managing pro se prisoner 
litigation and in enabling potentially meritorious complaints to move 
beyond the motion to dismiss stage. As our systematic review of prisoner 
form complaints has shown, however, many of the form complaints 
currently used impose unnecessary burdens on prisoners and the courts that 
are inconsistent with governing law.  
We recognize that what we suggest may only be a drop in the proverbial 
bucket. There are other, more significant, factors that contribute to the 
challenges of pro se prisoner litigation. Federally funded legal services are 
not available to prisoners and the resources of private or state-funded 
services are severely limited. Prison law libraries’ resources have been 
dramatically reduced. The PLRA creates additional complexities not 
contemplated here. But the fact that those additional challenges exist 
provides all the more reason that courts should now ensure that the forms 
they provide perform their intended function of reducing burdens for pro se 
prisoners and judges. We hope that this Article and proposed model 
complaint will serve as a guide to district courts in creating forms that help, 
not hinder, pro se prisoners in pleading their claims and judges in more 
efficiently and effectively addressing prisoner litigation.  
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APPENDIX216 
MODEL FORM COMPLAINT FOR PRISONERS FILING CIVIL 
RIGHTS ACTIONS IN FEDERAL COURT 
 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
___________ DISTRICT OF ___________ 
 
         ) 
_________________________________  ) 
_________________________________ ) 
(Include the full name and register number ) 
of every plaintiff who is filing this   ) Case No. ____________ 
complaint.)       ) 
) (Leave blank to be filled 
) by Clerk’s Office.) 
Plaintiff(s).        ) 
) 
v.          )   
)    
_________________________________ ) 
_________________________________ ) 
(Include the full name of every defendant ) 
who is being sued. Do not use “et al.”)  ) 
         ) 
         ) 
Defendant(s)       ) 
 
If the names of all parties do not fit in the space above, you may attach 
additional pages. Do not include addresses in this section.  
 
 
 
 216. The form complaints currently in use are created for and printed on 8.5x11 inch letter-sized 
paper. The print version of this article appears on smaller margins and so the model form complaint may 
appear unnaturally condensed. A full-size version of the model form complaint is available at 
http://www.drexel.edu/~/media/A69008C091854D35A248EC728C068DD1.ashx (last visited July 19, 
2017).  
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Caution: 
1. Do not use this form if you are challenging the 
validity of your criminal conviction or sentence. If 
you are challenging your conviction or sentence, 
you must file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 or a motion to vacate, set 
aside, or correct a sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 
Separate forms are available for these filings. If 
you use this form to challenge your conviction or 
sentence, you risk having your claim dismissed.217  
 
2. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, you are 
required to exhaust all remedies in your prison’s 
grievance system that are available to you before 
filing suit. This generally means that you must file 
a grievance and, if it is denied, appeal it through all 
available levels of review. Your case may be 
dismissed if you fail to exhaust administrative 
remedies. However, you are not required to plead 
or show that you have exhausted your claim in this 
complaint.218  
 
 
 217. Several districts provide this warning. See, e.g., Form Complaint (E.D. Va.); Form Complaint 
(W.D. Ky.), supra note 85, at 6; Form Complaint (E.D. Cal.), supra note 104, at 1; Form Complaint 
(N.D. Cal.), supra note 96, at 1. A complaint styled as a civil rights action that is a challenge to a criminal 
conviction or sentence may be dismissed for failure to state a claim and count as a strike under the 
PLRA. See, e.g., Padilla v. Enzor, 279 F. App’x. 606, 610–12 (10th Cir. 2008) (explaining that a district 
court has discretion to dismiss civil rights claims challenging a conviction or sentence or to 
recharacterize the complaint as a habeas action). It is worth noting that the FJC committee originally 
considered “including instructions describing the distinction . . . between habeas corpus and § 1983” but 
decided not to because the committee did not feel that it was appropriate to give legal advice and worried 
that trying to distill the law into a single sentence could result in inaccuracies that would “be misleading 
to the inmate.” 1976 REPORT, supra note 16, at 29. To be sure, any attempt to synthesize a legal doctrine 
into one or two sentences inevitably carries risk of being not fully accurate, or of failing to encompass 
uncommon circumstances. However, we believe that in light of the subsequent passage of the PLRA 
and the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), prisoners and courts are 
better served by a warning of the consequences of filing a civil rights claim that is really a habeas claim.  
 218. See, e.g., Form Complaint (W.D. Ky.), supra note 85. Although many form complaints warn 
plaintiffs that they must exhaust available administrative remedies, we chose the language used by the 
Western District of Kentucky because in addition to warning plaintiffs about the need for exhaustion, it 
also tells them that they are not required to plead exhaustion in the complaint. For the same reasons that 
we include a warning regarding claims challenging a conviction or sentence, we also include a warning 
that prisoners ordinarily must exhaust available remedies before filing suit. This provides the benefit of 
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3. Review your case carefully before filing. If your 
case is dismissed, it may affect your ability to file 
future civil actions while incarcerated without 
prepaying the full filing fee. Under the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner who has had 
three or more civil actions or appeals dismissed as 
frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim 
cannot file a new action without first paying the full 
filing fee, unless the prisoner is in imminent danger 
of serious bodily injury.219 You must also certify 
that this action is supported by law and fact and is 
not being brought for an improper purpose, such 
as to harass, to cause undue delay, or to increase 
the cost of litigation. 
  
 
 
informing a prisoner that he must exhaust administrative remedies without requiring a statement that he 
did so as part of the complaint. We also recognize that there are some situations in which a prisoner can 
pursue a claim even where the claim was not exhausted at the administrative level. See supra notes 107–
108 and accompanying text. However, we believe that on balance, the warning is more likely to aid 
prisoners than to mislead them.  
 219. Many complaints warn plaintiffs about the consequences of accruing three strikes under the 
PLRA. See, e.g., Form Complaint (N.D. W. Va.), supra note 180, at 2; Form Complaint (E.D. La.), 
supra note 88, at 5; Form Complaint (M.D. La.), supra note 88; Form Complaint (N.D. Miss.), supra 
note 84; Form Complaint (E.D. Ark.), supra note 85, at 3; Form Complaint (S.D. Iowa), supra note 88; 
Form Complaint (N.D. Cal.), supra note 96, at 2; Form Complaint (D. Mont.), supra note 169, at 3. 
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I.  PARTIES TO THIS CIVIL ACTION: 
 
Provide the information below for each plaintiff and defendant named in 
the complaint. You may attach additional pages if needed. 
 
Plaintiff(s) 
 
Name:    _________________________________ 
ID Number:   _________________________________ 
Address:    _________________________________ 
     _________________________________ 
     _________________________________ 
 
Defendant(s) 
 
Name:    _________________________________ 
Job or Title (if known): _________________________________ 
Employer (if known): _________________________________ 
Address:    _________________________________ 
     _________________________________ 
     _________________________________ 
 
 
II.  STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
 
State only the facts of your claim below. Include all the facts you consider 
important.220 Be as specific as possible.221 Make sure to describe exactly 
what each defendant did or failed to do that caused the alleged wrongful 
action222 and include any other facts that show why you believe what 
 
 
 220. Several form complaints currently in use utilize similar language. See, e.g., Form Complaint 
(D. Colo.), supra note 179, at 4; Form Complaint (D. Kan.), supra note 93, at 2; Form Complaint (D. 
Mont.), supra note 169, at 6; Form Complaint (D. Nev.), supra note 96, at 6; Form Complaint (D.N.M.), 
supra note 86, at 3; Form Complaint (E.D. Okla.), supra note 205, at 2; Form Complaint (N.D. Okla.), 
supra note 93, at 2; Form Complaint (S.D. Cal.), supra note 169, at 3; Form Complaint (C.D. Cal.), 
supra note 86, at 5. 
 221. A number of form complaints direct plaintiffs to be specific. See, e.g. Form Complaint (D. 
Ariz.), supra note 88, at 4 (“Be as specific as possible.”); Form Complaint (D. Conn.), supra note 206, 
at 5 (“[I]t is important to be specific about dates, times, and the names of the people involved.”). 
 222. See, e.g., Form Complaint (S.D. Ind.), supra note 207, at 2; Form Complaint (E.D. Mo.), supra 
note 207, at 5; Form Complaint (D. Neb.); Form Complaint (S.D. Iowa), supra note 88, at 4; Form 
Complaint (D. Ariz.), supra note 88, at 3; Form Complaint (S.D. Cal.), supra note 169, at 3; Form 
Complaint (D. Haw.), supra note 180, at 5; Form Complaint (D. Nev.), supra note 96, at 6; Form 
Complaint (D. Utah), supra note 207; Form Complaint (E.D. Tex.), supra note 84, at 4.  
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happened was wrong. You should include the names of all persons involved, 
when the events took place, where the events took place, what each person 
did or did not do, and a description of how you believe you were injured or 
how your rights were violated.223  
 
If you need additional space, you may attach extra pages. If you wish to 
include any documents to support the facts of your claim, you may attach 
them to this completed form.224 Please refer to specific documents if you 
rely on those documents to support your factual allegations. 
 
If you are bringing more than one claim, number each claim. Any claims 
that are not related to these events or to the injury you suffered should be 
raised in a separate civil action. 
 
____________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________ 
  
 
 
 223. Several districts direct plaintiffs to describe the facts in this “who, what, where, when, how” 
format. See, e.g., Form Complaint (W.D. Tex.), supra note 93, at 4; Form Complaint (E.D. Ky.); Form 
Complaint (D. Kan.), supra note 93, at 2. 
 224. See, e.g., Form Complaint (S.D. Ill.), supra note 86, at 5 (instructing plaintiffs that when 
describing the facts of the claim, “[y]ou should also attach any relevant, supporting documentation.”); 
JUSTICE & DIVERSITY CTR., supra note 209 (“You may attach documents that support your claims to 
the end of this Complaint as exhibits.”). 
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III.  STATEMENT OF LEGAL CLAIM:225  
 
You are not required to make legal argument or cite any cases or statutes in 
this complaint.226 However, you may state what constitutional rights, 
statutes, or laws you believe were violated by these actions.  You may cite 
cases or statutes if relevant. 
 
____________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
IV.  INJURY:  
 
Describe with specificity what injury, harm, or damages you suffered as a 
result of the events you describe above. 
 
____________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 225. Many districts follow this format of separating the statement of facts from the statement of the 
cause of action. This format gives prisoners the opportunity to identify their legal claims if they wish, 
while still ensuring that the statement of facts does not get cluttered up with legal argument. See, e.g., 
Form Complaint (D.P.R.), supra note 181; Form Complaint (E.D. Ky.); Form Complaint (E.D. Mich.), 
supra note 84, at 4–7; Form Complaint (D. Neb.); Form Complaint (S.D. Cal.), supra note 169, at 3; 
Form Complaint (D. Idaho), supra note 90, at 2; Form Complaint (D. Mont.), supra note 169, at 6; Form 
Complaint (D. Nev.), supra note 96, at 6; Form Complaint (D. Colo.), supra note 179, at 4; Form 
Complaint (D. Kan.), supra note 93, at 2; Form Complaint (D.N.M.), supra note 86, at 2–3; Form 
Complaint (M.D. Ala.), supra note 93; Form Complaint (M.D. Fla.), supra note 179, at 5; Form 
Complaint (N.D. Fla.), supra note 173, at 6–7.  
 226. A pro se prisoner’s identification of the legal causes of action or rights violated is meant to 
help provide guidance for the district court reviewing the complaint. However, a pro se prisoner’s 
misidentification of the relevant cause of action, or the prisoner’s failure to identify a legal cause of 
action, should not affect the sufficiency of the complaint. That is because the sufficiency of the complaint 
is determined by the facts alleged and not by the legal labels attached to them. See, e.g., Castro v. United 
States, 540 U.S. 375, 381–82 (2003) (citations omitted) (“Federal courts sometimes will ignore the legal 
label that a pro se litigant attaches to a motion and recharacterize the motion in order to place it within 
a different legal category. They may do so in order to avoid an unnecessary dismissal, to avoid 
inappropriately stringent application of formal labeling requirements, or to create a better 
correspondence between the substance of a pro se motion’s claim and its underlying legal basis.”). 
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V.  RELIEF: 
  
State exactly what you want the court to do for you. For example, you may 
be seeking money damages, you may want the court to order a defendant to 
do something or to stop doing something, or you may be seeking both kinds 
of relief.  
 
____________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
VI.  SIGNATURE 
 
By signing this complaint, you represent to the court that the facts alleged 
are true to the best of your knowledge and are supported by evidence, that 
those facts show a violation of law, and that you are not filing this complaint 
to harass another person or for any other improper purpose.227 
 
__________________________________ 
Signature of Plaintiff(s) 
 
__________________________________ 
Date of Signing 
 
 
 
 
 
 227. This form complaint does not require prisoners to file a verified complaint, that is, to swear 
under the penalty of perjury that the information contained in the complaint is true. Requiring prisoners 
to verify their complaints places a burden on them that does not apply to other litigants and that risks 
them being threatened with perjury charges if the complaint contains an error. See supra notes 145–146 
and accompanying text. At the same time, we recognize that a prisoner can sometimes benefit from filing 
a verified complaint. That is because a verified complaint can also be treated as an affidavit at later 
stages of the litigation, including at summary judgment. See, e.g., Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 
823 (4th Cir. 1991); Williams v. Adams, 935 F.2d 960, 961–62 (8th Cir. 1991). 
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